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INTRODUCTION
American antitrust and trade laws currently operate at odds:' while
antitrust protects consumers by promoting vigorous competition between
producers, the trade laws protect domestic industry from the effects of
unfair foreign trade. Though antitrust and trade laws both address price
discrimination2 and predation3 in the marketplace, each defines the term
"unfair" differently.' Numerous works have explored the extent to
1. Numerous works have examined the extent to which antitrust and trade law oper-
ate at odds. See, e.g., Mario Marques Mendes, Antitrust in a World of Interrelated Econ-
omies: The Interplay Between Antitrust and Trade Policies In The US and the EEC
(199 1) (discussing the conflict between antitrust and trade policy in the United States and
the EEC); American Bar Ass'n, Section of Antitrust Law, Task Force Report on the Inter-
face Between International Trade Law and Policy and Competition Law and Policy, 56
Antitrust L.J. 461 (1987) (reporting on the findings of a special committee appointed to
explore the inherent tension between antitrust and trade policy); Harvey M. Applebaum,
The Interface of Trade/Competition Law and Policy: An Antitrust Perspective, 56 Anti-
trust L.J. 409 (1987) (contending that antitrust and trade laws, which have fundamen-
tally different policy objectives, cannot realistically be reconciled); Ronald A. Cass, Price
Discrimination and Predation Analysis in Antitrust and International Trade: A Comment,
61 U. Cin. L. Rev. 877 (1993) (noting that antitrust and trade law each address price
discrimination and predation, though the extent to which economic analysis informs the
judicial and administrative decision-making process marks the principle difference be-
tween the two areas); Kenneth G. Elzinga, Antitrust Policy and Trade Policy: An Econo-
mist's Perspective, 56 Antitrust L.J. 439, 439 (1987) (noting that "there typically is a
conflict between antitrust policy and trade policy which stems from the difficulty of ad-
ministering the latter in a procompetitive fashion"). Elzinga's article concludes with a
telling metaphor:
The tack that trade policy often takes is the protection of the dinosaur. Trade
policy consistently bets on the wrong horse. Not because it doesn't know hor-
ses, but rather because [protectionists] will promote the horse that cannot win
in the open market. The antitruster, by contrast, applauds the entrepreneur
who welcomes the competitive fray.
Id. at 444; see also A. Paul Victor, Task Force Report on the Interface Between Interna-
tional Trade Law and Policy and Competition Law and Policy: Introduction, 56 Antitrust
L.J. 463 (1987) [hereinafter Task Force Report] (noting that the American economy has
long been driven by a policy of encouraging competition from both domestic and foreign
sources, but that a recent infusion of foreign goods, coupled with the internationalization
of competition, has encouraged greater application of American trade laws to impede the
flow of new competition); A. Paul Victor, Antidumping and Antitrust: Can the Inconsis-
tencies Be Resolved?, 15 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 339 (1983) (urging greater sensitivity to
competition policy in trade law enforcement).
2. Price discrimination is the pricing of a good or service at different levels in differ-
ent markets. It is possible whenever a seller is able to identify separate markets for its
product and charge higher prices to consumers who are willing to pay more for the prod-
uct. See Cass, supra note I, at 877. A classic example of price discrimination is the sale
of airline tickets, where the airline provides the same basic service with minor variations,
to different customers at different prices, by selling first class, business class, and economy
class tickets.
3. Predation is the pricing of a commodity below cost to drive competitors out of the
market. See id.
4. See id. (noting that the principal difference between the two bodies of law lies in
the extent to which economic analysis defines the limits of acceptable behavior in the
marketplace).
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which these two areas of law operate at cross-purposes.5
Existing American trade laws satisfy neither free trade advocates nor
domestic producers seeking protection from unfair foreign competition.
On the one hand, domestic producers claim that current trade laws fail
to deter injurious below-cost imports, a practice known as dumping.6
Domestic producers claim that well-financed foreign cartels subsidize
continuous dumping, despite existing American antidumping laws,
which impose a duty on dumped imports.' At issue are the prices of
5. See supra note 1.
6. Dumping has been defined as "[t]he act of selling in quantity at a very low price
or practically regardless of the price; also, selling goods abroad at less than the market
price at home." Black's Law Dictionary 502 (6th ed. 1990); see also Joseph E. Pattison,
Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws § 1.02[1], at 1-3 (1st ed. 8th release, Mar.
1994) (defining dumping as a form of price discrimination between national markets).
Trade laws define dumping as sales at "less-than-fair-value" ("LTFV"), that is, sales of a
commodity in the American market at prices below those offered for a "like product" in
the country of origin (the producer's "home market"), or in some instances, on the mar-
ket of a third country. See infra text accompanying notes 127-31. Dumping is consid-
ered one of the two principal unfair trade practices in the world. The other is the export
of subsidized goods. These goods may be sold at a fair price, but the government of the
exporting country distorts competition in international trade by granting subsidies to the
producer. Countervailing duty laws address this practice by levying a duty on the goods
to offset these government benefits. See Pattison, supra, § 1.0212], at 1-6. American
countervailing duty laws will not be discussed in this Note.
7. See; e.g., Daily Report for Executives; Regulation, Economics and Law, Interna-
tional Trade: Antitrust Solutions Urged For U.S. Steel Makers' Trade Joes, 1993 Daily
Exec. Rep. 189, at A-21 (Oct. 1, 1993) (reporting allegations by domestic steel producers
that foreign steel manufacturers, including producers from the European Community,
Japan, Korea, and Southeast Asia, are involved in widespread cartel activity). These
complaints assert that foreign steel manufacturers meet regularly to set prices and output
and that they have organized effective self-policing mechanisms for their restraint agree-
ments and even common accounts for payment of resulting penalties. See also Matsu-
shita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 578 (1986) (reinstating
summary judgment for Japanese television manufacturers). In that case, domestic televi-
sion producers alleged a conspiracy, beginning as early as 1953, of fixing and maintaining
artificially high prices for television receivers in Japan, while maintaining low prices for
televisions exported to the United States, to produce losses for American manufacturers.
See id,
These claims have spurred several legislative proposals targeted at predatory dumping
by foreign firms. See, e.g., S. 99, 103d Cong., Ist Sess., 139 Cong. Rec. S195-02 (daily ed.
Jan. 21, 1993) (sponsored by Sen. Metzenbaum) (proposing The International Fair Com-
petition Act, an amendment eliminating the specific intent element in the Antidumping
Act of 1916). The 1916 Act, a moribund statute, provides for a limited private right of
action for dumping violations, allowing treble damages for predatory dumping. It is sel-
dom pleaded because it requires a high standard of proof. See Spencer Weber Waller,
International Trade and U.S. Antitrust Law § 12.03, at 12-3 to 12-7 (1992). In recent
years, Congress has considered many proposals to provide a viable private right of action
for dumping. An evaluation of these bills is beyond the scope of this Note; many com-
mentators, however, have opined that such laws would lead to protectionist abuses, vio-
late international law, and promote an increase in litigation. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Kessler,
The Antidumping Act of 1916: Antitrust Analogue or Anathema?, 56 Antitrust LJ. 485
(1987) (contending that the 1916 Act is essentially an antitrust law in current form, and
amended versions would chill legitimate price competition from abroad and create a con-
flict with antitrust policy); Roger P. Alford, Note, Why A Private Right of Action Against
Dumping Would Violate GATT, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 696 (1991) (arguing that these recent
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many imported goods, such as minivans, 3.5-inch computer diskettes,
cellular mobile telephones, steel rails, forged steel crankshafts, oil drilling
equipment, color picture tubes, porcelain and steel cookware, chemicals,
frozen concentrated orange juice,' and laptop computer screens.9
Conversely, antitrust commentators and other free trade advocates ar-
gue that American antidumping laws are overprotective. They argue
that the antidumping laws: (1) harm consumers by denying them access
to competitively priced imported goods'0 and (2) in some cases precipi-
tate violations of antitrust laws."' Further, free trade advocates contend
that current antidumping laws harm producers because the antidumping
laws raise the cost of imported raw materials and component parts.'2
These critics also characterize the antidumping regime as a procedural
minefield"3 that is biased against foreign competitors in form and in ap-
plication and thus runs counter to fundamental principles of economics
and free trade.' 4 While there is no absolute consensus on the proper
proposals, which would give American litigants direct access to federal courts to seek
damages and injunctive relief, are incompatible with our obligations under the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT")).
8. See Richard Boltuck & Robert E. Litan, America's "Unfair" Trade Laws, in
Down in the Dumps: Administration of the Unfair Trade Laws 1, 22 (Richard Boltuck
& Robert E. Litan eds., 1991) [hereinafter Down in the Dumps].
9. See Daily Report for Executives; Regulation, Economics and Law, International
Trade: Japanese Flat-Panel Manufacturers Challenge U.S. Dumping Allegations, 1991
Daily Exec. Rep. 132, at A-2 (July 10, 1991). See infra Part III.B.
10. See, e.g., James Bovard, The Fair Trade Fraud 3-4 (1991) ("The U.S. government
does not penalize foreign companies for charging high prices-only for charging low
prices."); Elzinga, supra note 1, at 440-41 (contending that the trade laws enable a small
group of domestic producers to extract supracompetitive prices from American consum-
ers); Robert W. McGee, The Case to Repeal The Antidumping Laws, 13 Nw. J. Int'l L. &
Bus. 491 (1993) (calling for a repeal of the antidumping laws); Diane P. Wood, "Unfair"
Trade Injury: A Competition-Based Approach, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 1153 (1989) (applying
antitrust concepts to injury determinations under the trade laws to promote convergence
of antitrust and trade law and increase consumer welfare).
11. See Pierre F. de Ravel d'Esclapon, Non-Price Predation and the Improper Use of
US. Unfair Trade Laws, 56 Antitrust L.J. 543 (1987) (noting that there are antitrust
problems implicit in the antidumping laws, because it is often desirable, even necessary,
for domestic industry collectively to pursue a case, requiring the exchange of pricing and
other market information and that informal settlement agreements often restrain trade in
direct violation of section I of the Sherman Act); see infra Part II.H.
12. See Boltuck & Litan, supra note 8, at 6-7; The Interface of Trade Competition Law
and Policy: Questions and Answers, 56 Antitrust L.J. 457, 459 (1987) [hereinafter Ques-
tions and Answers] (reporting the remarks of Terry Calvani, Commissioner, Federal
Trade Commission) (referring to protection of the steel industry and the consequent cost
increases to producers of other goods who use steel in their production).
13. See Bovard, supra note 10, at 119-31, 134-39; see infra note 131; Part II.E.
14. See, e.g., John J. Barcel6 III, The Antidumping Law: Repeal It or Revise It, in
Antidumping Law: Policy & Implementation, I Mich. Y.B. Int'l Legal Stud. 53 (1979)
(noting the relatively low injury threshold under the antidumping laws, the beneficial
aspects of price discrimination in international trade, and urging the application of anti-
trust concepts to trade actions); Bovard, supra note 10 (noting that though the trade laws
are enacted under the guise of fairness, they are laden with procedural abuses and foster
protectionism); Down in the Dumps, supra note 8 (analyzing procedural abuses inherent
in the antidumping laws and contending that most of the biases may be removed merely
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roles of antitrust"5 and trade policy, domestic consumers and producers
clearly benefit from low prices resulting from competition among domes-
tic and foreign producers.16 Ideally, antitrust and trade laws should both
encourage such competition as well as simultaneously deter foreign pro-
ducers who exploit market power' 7 or government subsidies to injure effi-
cient domestic producers. Achieving this balance requires a consistent
definition of "unfair" for domestic and international trade.
This Note suggests a framework for the convergence of antitrust and
trade laws to achieve such a balance. Specifically, this Note advocates
modifying or replacing the current antidumping laws with a trade law
resembling the Robinson-Patman Act,"8 which does not currently apply
through changes in administrative practice, without the need for Congressional ap-
proval); William J. Davey, Antidumping Laws: A Time For Restriction, 1988 Fordham
Corp. Law Inst. 8-1 (Barry E. Hawk ed. 1989) (finding that the antidumping laws have
no economic justification, are applied to protect concentrated industries, and should be
repealed); J. Michael Finger, The Meaning of "Unfair" in United States Import Policy, 1
Minn. J. Global Trade 35 (1992) (arguing that politics and injury to domestic producers,
rather than objective evaluations of whether trade is unfair, govern application of the
trade laws against imports).
Indeed, antidumping laws are considered a form of non-tariff barrier, and their applica-
tion was debated at the recently-completed multilateral negotiations of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT') at the Uruguay Round. See Asra Q.
Nomani & Lawrence Ingrassia, Breakthroughs in Trade Talks are Announced, Wall St.
J., Dec. 13, 1993, at A3; Bob Davis, From "Fast Track" to French Films, Making Sense of
World Trade Talks, Wall St. J., Dec. 13, 1993, at A16. The GATT was organized in
Geneva in 1947 to devise rules for international trade. See id It has sponsored seven
rounds of trade talks through which tariffs have been significantly decreased. See id. The
GATT negotiations involved 117 nations. See id The latest round of negotiations began
in Punta del Este, Uruguay, in September 1986. See id On December 12, 1993, negotia-
tors tentatively reached agreement on procedures for handling of dumping complaints.
See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Nego-
tiations, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 1 (1994) [hereinafter GATT 1993].
15. See infra note 237.
16. See infra Part I.A.
17. Market power is the ability of a single firm to affect the market-wide price for a
given commodity. See Lawrence Anthony Sullivan, Antitrust § 8, at 30 (1977). The
producer's individual share of the relevant product market, see infra note 25, is directly
proportional to its market power. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Economics & Federal Anti-
trust Law § 3.2, at 59 (1985). The reaction of buyers to a seller's price changes also
dictates the degree to which that seller possesses market power. See Sullivan, supra, § 8,
at 30. This, in turn, depends on the availability of substitutes for the seller's product. See
id. § 8, at 31; Department of Justice and Federal Trade Comm'n, 1992 Horizontal
Merger Guidelines, reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,103, at 20,551 (Apr. 2,
1992) [hereinafter Merger Guidelines] (defining market power as "the power profitably to
restrict output and raise prices"). Definition of the relevant product market is essential to
determining whether a firm possesses market power. See Sullivan, supra, § 12, at 41; see
infra note 25 (summarizing the relationship between the relevant product market, market
power, and market concentration).
18. Act of June 19, 1936, ch. 592, § 1, 49 Stat. 1526 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 13
(1988)). The first section of the Act is an amendment to § 2 of the Clayton Act, ch. 323,
§ 2, 38 Stat. 730, 730-31 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1988)). The Robin-
son-Patman Act punishes price discrimination, see supra note 2, where the effect is sub-
stantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.
See infra Part I.A.3.
1994] 2051
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
to the international transactions covered by the antidumping laws.' 9
Adopting the current judicial construction of the Robinson-Patman Act
provides a consistent definition of "unfair" for domestic and interna-
tional trade, and thus promotes the convergence of antitrust and trade
laws. Enactment of such a law fulfills several objectives. It (1) in-
troduces into trade laws the accepted predatory-pricing tests developed
under Sherman Act jurisprudence, (2) balances deterrence of trade law
abuse with the incentives for domestic industries to bring trade actions
where viable claims of predation by foreign cartels exist, (3) bypasses the
existing jurisdictional hurdles associated with applying antitrust laws to
penalize predatory imports, and (4) allows competitive foreign producers
the benefit of currently unavailable defenses to frivolous or bad-faith an-
tidumping claims.
This Note has four parts. Part I of this Note provides background
information on existing antitrust and antidumping laws. Part II dis-
cusses the extent to which these two bodies operate at odds and the
weaknesses of antitrust and antidumping policy in defining and deterring
injury from unfair foreign trade practices. Part II also examines several
aspects of the antidumping regime that commentators criticize as protec-
tionist. Part III analyzes a recent trade dispute to illustrate the merits of
harmonizing antitrust and trade law. Part IV of this Note suggests a
model trade law that reduces the disharmony between antitrust and an-
tidumping laws. This Note concludes that Congress must modify or re-
place our current antidumping laws with an analogue to the Robinson-
Patman Act to provide a consistent definition of "unfair" for domestic
and international trade.
I. EXISTING ANTITRUST AND TRADE LAW
This Part summarizes basic principles of the antitrust and antidump-
ing laws.
A. Antitrust Law
This overview of antitrust law begins with a summary of the underly-
ing principles of economics. A discussion of the Sherman Act follows,
with an emphasis on attempted monopolization through predatory pric-
ing. This section concludes with an outline of black-letter Robinson-Pat-
man law.
1. Introduction: The Economic Foundations of Antitrust Law
Market economics assumes that consumers are "best off if they can
make voluntary exchanges of goods and services in competitive mar-
kets."2 If all exchanges are voluntary, then each consumer will continue
19. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 723 F.2d 238, 316-17 (3d
Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
20. Hovenkamp, supra note 17, § 1.1, at 1.
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to exchange goods and services "until he can make himself no better off
by an exchange that is voluntary for both parties to the transaction."'"
Further, so long as all exchanges take place at competitive prices, society
also will be wealthier than it would have been if some exchanges oc-
curred at higher or lower prices.22 Thus, the overriding goal of antitrust
law is to ensure the competitiveness of markets.23
. Antitrust law accepts a single business firm as the basic economic
unit.24 A firm's competitive behavior vis-a-vis other firms in the same
market (the "relevant product market"25), in which all firms endeavor to
21. Id.
22. See id.
23. See id.; Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962) (noting that
the antitrust laws were enacted for "the protection of competition, not competitors");
Brunswick Corp. v. Riegel Textile Corp., 752 F.2d 261, 266 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J.)
("The purpose of the antitrust laws as it is understood in the modem cases is to preserve
the health of the competitive process... rather than to promote the welfare of particular
competitors."), cert denied, 472 U.S. 1018 (1985).
24. See Phillip Areeda & Louis Kaplow, Antitrust Analysis: Problems, Text, Cases
187 (1988).
25. A relevant market for a product is defined by reference to the substitutability of
one product for another. See Hovenkamp, supra note 17, § 3.2, at 59-61. "A 'relevant
market,' then, is the narrowest market which is wide enough so that products from adja-
cent areas or from other producers in the same area cannot compete on substantial parity
with those included in the market." Sullivan, supra note 17, § 12, at 41. Firms compete
with one another for sales in the same market-the "relevant market."
Proper determination of the relevant market is crucial to any antitrust litigation be-
cause it is the first step in measuring a firm's market power. See id.; see supra note 17.
Prior to 1982, defining the relevant market in an antitrust proceeding was, in one com-
mentator's words, "a game of creative market definition." Kenneth Kelly, Empirical
Analysis for Antitrust and International Trade Law, 61 U. Cin. L. Rev. 889, 893 (1993)
(referring to Brown Shoe, the leading merger case of the day). Since 1982, the Merger
Guidelines have influenced calculation of market definition. The Guidelines provide an
economic methodology to the definition of relevant markets. Under the Guidelines, a
market is first defined "as a group of products and a geographic area such that a hypo-
thetical firm" would possess market power in that area. Merger Guidelines, supra note
17, 13,103, at 20,551 (June 14, 1984). A firm would not possess market power if an
attempt to impose "a 'small but significant and nontransitory' price increase" would
cause buyers to switch to other products or result in the entry of competing sellers. Id.
The Guidelines apply these principles to a standard known as the "five-percent test." Id.
This test provides for the construction of an economic model, in which the prices of each
product of each merging firm increase by five percent. The likely competitive responses
of buyers and competing sellers are then analyzed. If these competitive responses would
render the price increase unprofitable (because competitors would enter the market and
purchasers would substitute competing products), then the area and group of products
are expanded to encompass additional substitutes until it would be profitable to impose
the price increase. The relevant market is defined as that market in which it would be
profitable for the seller to impose the five-percent price increase. See id. at 20,551-552.
Even under the Guidelines, notes Professor Kelly, market definition is still a point of
contention in antitrust cases and the subject of an enormous amount of literature. See
Kelly, supra, at 896 & n.20.
No such economic methodology is employed in trade cases to define a relevant market.
The divergence in the methodology used to define a relevant market in antitrust and trade
cases is of critical importance to understanding why the antidumping laws are, in the
opinion of many commentators, deficient in causal analysis, and consequently restrain
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set a profit-maximizing price, 2 6 is the premise underlying competition
competition in the international trade context. See infra Part II.C. (discussing the inade-
quate causal analysis in evaluating a dumping claim); Kelly, supra, at 892-97.
Market concentration is a function of the number of firms in the relevant market and
their respective shares. See Hovenkamp, supra note 17, § 11.3, at 300-01. A market is
said to be concentrated if a relatively small number of firms possess a large share of that
market. See id. Concentration relates to market power, see supra note 17, because in a
concentrated market, an individual firm has greater potential to affect the market-wide
price of the commodity through its own pricing and output decisions, though this is not
always so (if, for example, a firm in a concentrated market controls a relatively small
share of the market).
The "four-firm concentration ratio" ("CR4") is one measure of market concentration.
The CR4 is computed by adding the market shares of the four largest firms in the relc-
vant market. For example, a market in which the four largest firms have market shares
of 30%, 25%, 15%, and 5% has a CR4 of 75. See Hovenkamp, supra note 17, § 11.3, at
300. Most economists today prefer to measure market concentration with the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index ("HHI"), which is the sum of the squares of every firm in
the market. See id. § 11.4, at 301-04. Thus in a market composed of four firms with
market shares of 40%, 25%, 20%, and 15%, the HHI would be 2850 (402 + 25' + 20
+ 152 = 2850). The HHI ranges from 10,000 (in the case of a pure monopoly) to a
number approaching zero (in the case of an atomistic market). See id. The Department
of Justice and Federal Trade Commission calculate market concentration in evaluating
horizontal mergers, because market concentration is a useful indicator of the likely poten-
tial competitive effect of a merger. The Government began using the HHI method in
1982. Under current policy, a post-merger HHI below 1000 designates an unconcen-
trated market, a post-merger HHI between 1000 and 1800 is regarded as moderately
concentrated, and a post-merger HHI above 1800 is considered highly concentrated. See
Merger Guidelines, supra note 17, 1 13,104, at 20,573-5 to 20,573-6 (Apr. 7, 1992);
Hovenkamp, supra note 17, § 11-5, at 304.
26. In a perfectly competitive market, every good is priced at the cost of production,
leaving producers and sellers only enough profit to maintain investment in the industry,
and every person willing to pay this price will be able to buy the good. See Hovenkamp,
supra note 17, § 1.1, at I to 2. In such a market, firms are all "price takers"; that is,
individually, they cannot affect the market price. See id. § 1-1, at 9. All sellers manufac-
ture a perfectly homogeneous product, and thus the consumer is completely indifferent as
to from whom he buys. See id. § 1-1, at 2. Each seller is so small that its entry into or
exit from the market has no effect on the decisions of other sellers. Further, all sellers
have the same access to needed inputs and all participants have complete knowledge of
price, output, and other information about the market. In such instances, a firm's profit-
maximizing price is equal to its marginal cost of production. See id. § 1.1, at 13. Margi-
nal cost is the incremental cost a firm incurs in producing one additional unit of output.
See id. § 1.1, at 10. Another producer in the perfectly competitive market will undercut
any firm that attempts to set a price greater than marginal cost because the individual
competitor faces an infinite elasticity of demand-any increase in price, however slight,
will induce consumers to switch to substitute products, which other suppliers will readily
offer in response to a competitor's price increase. A firm that raises prices above margi-
nal cost will thus lose all sales. See id. § 1.1, at 9.
A monopolist, however, is not a "price taker." A monopolist is the only firm selling in
a particular market, and has one power that the perfect competitor does not: the monop-
olist can control the entire output of the market. See id. § 1.1, at 14. This is so because
there are no competitors to respond to the monopolist's decline in output with an offset-
ting output increase. Therefore, by reducing output, the monopolist can obtain a higher
price per unit, provided that demand remains unchanged. See id. § 1.2, at 14-15.
Though both the monopolist and the perfect competitor maximize revenue by equating
marginal revenue with marginal cost, see id. § 1.2, at 16, for the monopolist, marginal
revenue is always below price. Accordingly, the output at which marginal cost equals
marginal revenue will generate a price exceeding marginal cost. See id. Marginal reve-
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under the antitrust laws.
2. The Sherman Antitrust Act
The Sherman Antitrust Act2" (the "Sherman Act"), coined the
"Magna Carta of free enterprise,"2 does not prohibit specific types of
anticompetitive conduct. The Act essentially grants general authority to
courts to define and deter anticompetitive activity. Thus, courts applying
the Sherman Act sit as common law courts, developing antitrust law
through judicial reasoning.29
The Sherman Act seeks to promote competition between firms within
the relevant market by preventing firms from combining or agreeing with
one another to function as a single economic unit, also known as a trust
or cartel.30 Absent such legal restrictions, firms could exchange price
and output information or join together to eliminate competition among
themselves. Absent competition, these firms could act as a single-firm
monopolist to restrict output and thereby raise consumer prices.
a. Section 1 of the Sherman Act
To prevent such abuses, section 1 of the Sherman Act proscribes
"every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or con-
spiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations.",32
Much of the case law under the Sherman Act focuses on defining what
constitutes an agreement and what evidence is sufficient to prove the
existence of such an agreement between firms.33 Thus, the case law has
nue is the gain from producing a single additional unit of output. Thus, compared to the
firm in a perfectly competitive market, the monopolist achieves a higher profit-maximiz-
ing price, at a lower rate of output. See id. § 1.2, at 14 to 17.
Most firms operate in neither a perfectly competitive market, nor a market in which
they have no competition (a mdnopoly). More common is the oligopoly, a market popu-
lated by a small number of producers. Behavior of an oligopolist falls between that of a
monopolist and a perfectly competitive firm. See Areeda & Kaplow, supra note 24, at 18-
19.
27. Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-
7) (1988)). The elements of a Sherman Act § 1 violation are: (1) joint action that (2)
unreasonably restrains trade, and (3) affects interstate or foreign commerce. See Stan-
dard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1910).
28. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
29. See Areeda & Kaplow, supra note 24, at 51.
30. See Sullivan, supra note 17, § 59, at 152-55.
31. See Areeda & Kaplow, supra note 24, at 188.
32. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
33. An agreement can be express, see, e.g., United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight
Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 331-32, 341-42 (1897) (holding that "memorandum of agreement"
between eighteen railroads for setting uniform freight rates had violated the Sherman
Act), or inferred from circumstantial evidence. See, eg., American Tobacco Co. v.
United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809-10 (1946) (finding conspiracy from circumstantial evi-
dence, where prices of competing brands of cigarettes increased on the same day, where
there was no economic justification for the increase); id. at 809 ("No formal agreement is
necessary to constitute an unlawful conspiracy."); Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers'
19941 2055
2056 FORDIJAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62
discussed whether concerted refusals to deal, 34 geographic divisions of a
market between competitors, 35 mergers and joint ventures in certain cir-
Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 612 (1914) (upholding trial court's finding that
retail lumber dealers had agreed to withhold patronage of wholesalers who had sold di-
rectly to consumers in competition with the retailers, where conspiracy was inferred from
the dealers' circulation of lists of offending wholesalers among themselves); Ambook
Enter. v. Time, Inc., 612 F.2d 604, 616 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that evidence of conscious
parallelism could be joined with other circumstantial evidence of coercion by other par-
ticipants "in further support of an inference of agreement"), cert. dismissed, 448 U.S. 914
(1980); Overseas Motors v. Import Motors Ltd., 375 F. Supp. 499, 535 (E.D. Mich. 1974)
("[C]onspiracy may be inferred where the surrounding circumstances make it unlikely
that the parallelism of action was purely coincidental."), aff'd, 519 F.2d 119 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 987 (1975). But see Theatre Enters. v. Paramount Film Distrib.
Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 540-41 (1954) (finding that uniform action of defendants was attrib-
utable to revenue-maximizing individual business judgment). There the Court held:
The crucial question is whether respondents' conduct toward petitioner
stemmed from independent decision or from an agreement, tacit or express....
Circumstantial evidence of consciously parallel behavior may have made heavy
inroads into the traditional judicial attitude toward conspiracy; but "conscious
parallelism" has not yet read conspiracy out of the Sherman Act entirely.
34. Any agreement affecting competitive behavior arguably is the equivalent of an
understanding that the collaborators will not buy or sell on any other terms. Thus, it is
often difficult to distinguish a concerted refusal to deal, commonly known as a boycott,
from a refusal to sell except on condition. Boycott cases, however, are distinguishable
from price-fixing cases: the former involve an agreement to refrain from competition
within a group to exploit, but not destroy, customers or suppliers, whereas the latter often
involve collective activity among a group of competitors to weaken a rival. Boycott cases
are actionable under both § 1 of the Sherman Act, as combinations in restraint of trade,
and under § 2, as combinations and conspiracies in an attempt to monopolize. See
Areeda & Kaplow, supra note 24, at 364-65; Aspen Highlands Skiing Co. v. Aspen Skiing
Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 608-11 (1985) (finding liability from defendant's abrupt refusal to
continue cooperating in group ticket plan, where there was no procompetitive justifica-
tion for doing so); Eastern States, 234 U.S. at 614 (finding that defendant retail lumber
dealer had conspired to boycott wholesalers who made direct sales to consumers, thus
competing with member dealers) ("An act harmless when done by one may become a
public wrong when done by many acting in concert, for it then takes on the form of a
conspiracy, and may be prohibited. . . ."); Fashion Originators' Guild of Am., Inc. v.
FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 465-68 (1941) (finding defendant Guild and designer manufacturers
and sellers of garments in violation of the Sherman Act for maintaining policy of boycott-
ing retailers who also accepted for sale lower-priced copies of designer-labelled fashions);
Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 149-54 (1951) (holding illegal defend-
ant newspaper's unilateral refusal to accept advertising from merchants who also adver-
tised with a newly-formed radio station that threatened the newspaper's monopoly of
local advertising market). But see Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268
U.S. 588, 601-06 (1925) (finding that no unlawful restraint of commerce occurred where
defendant cement manufacturers exchanged credit and other information regarding buy-
ers to protect themselves from fraud).
35. Several competitors might agree to divide a market geographically among them-
selves such that there will be no competition between them in their respectively allocated
areas. This is essentially a form of cartel, actionable both as an unlawful agreement in
restraint of commerce under § 1, and as attempted monopolization under § 2. See, e.g.,
United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972) (finding liability under § 1)
("This Court has reiterated time and again that '[h]orizontial territorial limitations ...
are naked restraints of trade with no purpose except stifling of competition.' ") (citations
omitted).
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cumstances,36 cartels,37 and combinations formed for influencing govern-
mental bodies to act in a manner that suppresses competition,38 are
illegal under the Sherman Act.
Within section 1 case law, courts have held that some horizontal 9
agreements are per se violations of the Sherman Act, while other agree-
ments have been analyzed under the rule of reason." Numerous Sher-
36. See, e.g., National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of
Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 106-08 (1984) (condemning joint venture as an unreasonable restraint
of trade for restricting competition and limiting live broadcasts of college football);
Areeda & Kaplow, supra note 24, at 793-921 (mergers).
37. See Areeda & Kaplow, supra note 24, at 188-89. A cartel exists when all competi-
tors in a given market join together to act as a single firm, eliminating competition be-
tween themselves and setting a restricted output for each member (a quota), thereby
raising prices. Most cartels, however, are imperfect; members face problems in reaching
agreement between one another. Individual members of a cartel have natural incentives
to cheat other members by selling over their individually allocated output quotas.
Cartels often set an output restraining price in lieu of a quota. In that case, members
also have incentives to violate the agreement with other cartel members. "[Tlhe effect of
fixing a price well above costs is to induce each collaborator to try to win additional
sales." Id at 189. This may result in individual expansion of output to the point where
the market will not bear the cartel price. See id. Individual members may cheat even
with knowledge that an increase in individual output will affect the market price. Mem-
ber firms may also set, and then conceal, their own lower prices, to increase their profits
at the expense of the cartel. Once discovered, however, cheating may spread and lead to
the collapse of the cartel. See id. Cartel members may also engage in certain non-price
competition to increase sales above allocated limits, for example, by offering additional
services to consumers without charge. See id.
38. A trilogy of Supreme Court cases establish that a firm may petition the govern-
ment for relief, either at the judicial, executive, or administrative level, with limited fear
of liability under domestic antitrust law. This is so even when the petitioner's intent is to
eliminate legitimate competition. This is commonly known as the Noerr-Pennington doc-
trine. See Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127,
137-40 (1961); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 669-70 (1965); Cali-
fornia Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 509-11 (1972). Under
Noerr-Pennington, however, the right to petition the U.S. government is not absolute. An
antitrust violation occurs when a petition is "a mere sham to cover what is actually noth-
ing more than an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a compet-
itor ... " Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144. Later cases elaborate on the doctrine and the "sham"
exception. See FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 424-25 (1990)
(distinguishing Noerr and declining to extend immunity to boycotts designed to exact
higher fees); Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 499-502
(1988) (declining to extend Noerr immunity to attempts to influence a private associa-
tion's product standards, which were routinely adopted by state and local governments).
39. A horizontal restraint of trade pertains to an agreement between competitors at
the same level of distribution. See Black's Law Dictionary 737 (6th ed. 1990).
40. Earlier interpretations of the Sherman Act held that any agreement between firms
to cooperate in setting prices or output constituted a per se violation of the Sherman Act,
regardless of actual effects on competition. See, eg., United States v. Trans-Missouri
Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 329-31 (1897) (rejecting a defense claim that § 1 prohibited
only unreasonable price-fixing agreements, as was the case under the common law. The
Court also rejected the argument that Congress intended to exclude the railroads from
§ 1 because of the impossibility of covering fixed costs when subject to unfettered compe-
tition.). Courts have long held, however, that certain forms of collaborative activity
should be permitted, even though some limits on prices or competition may result.
Courts have distinguished these types of restraints under the doctrine known as the rule
of reason. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1910) (establishing the
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man Act cases address the reasonableness of an agreement between
competitors.4 '
b. Section 2 of the Sherman Act
Section 242 of the Sherman Act punishes persons or firms who "mo-
nopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any
other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or com-
merce among the several States, or with foreign nations."43
A pure monopoly exists where only one firm supplies the entire mar-
ket.' A monopoly, however, may occur where there is more than one
producer in the relevant product market,4" provided that one firm-the
monopolist-dominates output; that is, the monopolist must possess
market power.46 The elements of monopolization are "(1) the possession
of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition
or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or develop-
ment as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or his-
rule of reason in holding that the Sherman Act did "not specify] but indubitably contem-
plat[ed] and requir[ed] a standard, [and] it follows that [Congress] intended that the stan-
dard of reason which had been applied at the common law ... was intended to be the
measure.. ." for determining violations under § 1.).
Some agreements immediately fall within the per se rule. See, e.g., United States v.
Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397-402 (1927) (refusing to evaluate the defendant's
argument that the prices at issue were reasonable in holding that price-fixing agreements
are per se violative of § 1 of the Sherman Act). But cf National Soc'y of Professional
Eng'g v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692-95 (1978) (following a rule of reason analysis
and holding that petitioner's canon of ethics prohibiting members from submitting com-
petitive bids for engineering services amounted to an agreement restraining trade under
§ 1); Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238-41 (1918) (applying the rule of
reason in determining that regulation restricting members' grain trading after the closing
bid on the exchange (the "Call") to the "Call price" did not violate the Sherman Act).
The Court found that every agreement necessarily restrains trade in some manner, and
the issue was whether the restraint reduces or enhances competition: "[t]he true test of
legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby
promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competi-
tion." Id. at 238. There it was apparent that the rule at issue was not aimed at manipulat-
ing prices. See also United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 219-24 &
n.59 (1940) (holding conspiracy to maintain gasoline prices was unlawful per se, whether
or not conspiracy was successful or other factors may have contributed to the stability of
the spot price under manipulation and declining to consider a defense that the price-fixing
scheme was intended to alleviate competitive abuses inherent in that market.).
41. See, e.g., National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of
Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 98-113 (1984) (holding that college athletic association's plan for
televising college football games of member institutions was an illegal combination in
restraint of trade under § 1); United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 606-12 (1972)
(holding territorial restraints violated § 1); Fashion Originators' Guild of Am., Inc. v.
FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 465-68 (1941) (holding that manufacturing association's policy of
boycotting retailers that accepted competing goods violated § 1).
42. See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
43. Id.
44. See Hovenkamp, supra note 17, § 1.2, at 14.
45. See supra note 25.




Section 2 also forbids attempted monopolization. 48 Attempted mo-
nopolization requires proof of (1) a relevant product market and geo-
graphic market that the defendant seeks to monopolize, (2) exclusionary
conduct manifesting a specific intent to monopolize,49 and (3) a danger-
ous probability of success.50
i. Predatory Pricing
A paramount concern of Sherman Act drafters was attempted monop-
olization through predatory pricing.' During the late eighteenth cen-
tury52 it was widely believed that large trusts could afford short-term,
below-cost price cuts. Smaller competitors, unable to meet these price
cuts, would eventually lose all sales to the larger predatory competitor.
Once the predatory pricer eliminated competition in this fashion, it could
raise prices to monopolistic levels.53
Predatory pricing presupposes high barriers to entry; that is, produc-
tion must require a substantial capital base.54 If a market has low barri-
ers to entry, start-up competitors quickly can enter the market as soon as
47. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
48. See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
49. See Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 153-57 (1951); Sullivan,
supra note 17, § 51, at 135.
50. See Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905); American Tobacco
Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 785 (1946) ("The phrase 'attempt to monopolize'
means the employment of methods, means, and practices which would, if successful, ac-
complish monopolization, and which, though falling short, nevertheless approach so
close as to create a dangerous probability of it. . . .") (quoting with approval the trial
court's jury instructions); Sullivan, supra note 17, §§ 50 & 51, at 134-38; see also United
States v. Empire Gas Corp., 537 F.2d 296, 305 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding that the danger-
ous probability of success requirement, which makes both definitions of the relevant mar-
ket and proof of the defendant's market share essential elements of the case, could not be
met, even accepting the government's argument that the defendant firm held a 50% mar-
ket share, since the record did not indicate that competitors would be susceptible to in-
timidation by defendant), cert denied, 429 U.S. 1122 (1977); accord International Distrib.
Ctrs., Inc. v. Walsh Trucking Co., 812 F.2d 786, 792-93 (2d Cir.) (dangerous probability
that market would be monopolized did not exist where defendant firm did not have sig-
nificant market power and would not acquire that power even if it succeeded in driving
competitor out of business), cerL denied, 482 U.S. 915 (1987); Oliver E. Williamson,
Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 Yale L.J. 284, 292 (1977) (at least
60% share necessary); Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Williamson on Predatory
Pricing, 87 Yale L.J. 1337, 1348 (1978) (60% share not enough).
51. See Waller, supra note 7, § 2.06, at 2-14.
52. The Sherman Act was enacted on July 2, 1890.
53. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 584 (1986)
(restating plaintiffs' allegations that foreign television manufacturers conspired to price
television sets below cost in the United States and drive American manufacturers out of
business, then restrict output and raise prices to monopoly levels); Waller, supra note 7,
§ 2.06, at 2-14.
54. See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2578,
2589 (1993); Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices
Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 697, 698-99 (1975).
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the predatory pricer has driven out competition and raised prices." New
entrants compete by setting lower prices to frustrate the predatory
pricer's attempted monopolization.5 6
Confusion has characterized predatory-pricing law, despite numerous
predatory-pricing claims. Predatory-pricing law remains unsettled,
though the Supreme Court recently clarified the elements of a prima facie
predatory-pricing claim.57 There is currently no consensus among courts
and commentators regarding the appropriate cost test58 for predatory
pricing. Price reductions constituting genuine competitive responses to
market conditions are permissible.59 "Pricing is predatory only where
the firm forgoes short-term profits in order to develop a market position
such that the firm can later raise prices and recoup lost profits....
Many commentators have offered specific price-cost tests to define the
difference between competitive and anticompetitive price reductions. 6'
In Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco,62 the Supreme
Court held that to plead a prima facie predatory-pricing claim, a plaintiff
must demonstrate (1) that the prices complained of are below an appro-
55. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588-89 (stating that predatory-pricing conspiracies
are by nature speculative since conspirators must have reasonable expectations of recoup-
ing more than their losses through monopoly profits, and monopoly profits encourage
new entrants).
56. See id.
57. See Brooke Group, 113 S. Ct. at 2587-88 (setting out the elements of a prima facie
predatory-pricing claim, though declining to resolve the dispute among circuit courts
concerning the proper cost measure of predatory pricing, after the parties stipulated that
sales above average variable cost ("AVC") should not be considered actionable).
58. See infra notes 61-78 and accompanying text.
59. See William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d
1014, 1031 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982).
60. Id. (quoting Janich Bros., Inc. v. American Distilling Co., 570 F.2d 848, 856 (9th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 829 (1978)).
61. See, e.g., Areeda & Turner, supra note 54, at 709-16; Richard A. Posner, Anti-
trust Law: An Economic Perspective 190-93 (1976) (positing that "average balance-sheet
cost" provides the proper inquiry in predatory-pricing analysis); F. M. Scherer, Predatory
Pricing and the Sherman Act: A Comment, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 869 (1976) (criticizing the
approach of Professors Areeda and Turner, and arguing that long-run allocative effi-
ciency is maximized in some cases where a monopolist's price exceeds marginal cost and
in other cases where marginal cost is undercut); Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner,
Scherer on Predatory Pricing: A Reply, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 891 (1976) (admitting the theo-
retical desirability of long-run welfare maximization, but arguing that the factors re-
quired to determine long-run consequences are inherently speculative and indeterminate);
F. M. Scherer, Some Last Words on Predatory Pricing, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 901 (1976) (reit-
erating that long-run allocative efficiency should be the focus of predation analysis and
arguing that the requisite variables can be determined with sufficient accuracy); Richard
Schmalansee, On the Use of Economic Models in Antitrust: The Realemon Case, 127 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 994 (1979) (arguing that standard economic models do not always explain
market behavior or lend themselves to logical conclusions in predatory-pricing cases);
Williamson, supra note 50, at 289-90 (eschewing reliance on marginal costs and analyzing
predatory pricing targeted at established firms differently from the inquiry where new
entrants are targeted); Areeda & Turner, supra note 50 (criticizing Professor William-
son's analysis as administratively complex and questionable in total welfare gains).
62. 113 S. Ct. 2578 (1993).
1994] ANTITRUST & TRADE LAW 2061
priate measure of its rival's costs, 63 and (2) "that the competitor had a
... dangerous probability[] of recouping its investment in below-cost
prices."'  The Court emphasized the recoupment requirement as "the
ultimate object of an unlawful predatory-pricing scheme, "61 because re-
coupment is the means by which the predatory pricer recognizes the
profits of the price-cutting behavior. The dispute over "appropriate
measure[s] ' ' 66 of a defendant's costs of production, however, is still
unresolved.67
(a) The Areeda-Turner Test
Professors Phillip Areeda and Donald Turner developed the seminal
antitrust price-cost test.68 It has proved influential in courts69 and has
influenced at least one Justice Department decision to withdraw a suit in
progress. 70  One of their primary concerns is that predatory-pricing
claims, absent a price-cost test, could be employed to stifle legitimate
price competition and protect inefficient producers.7 ' Areeda and Tur-
ner argue that pricing at or above a firm's marginal cost 2 of production
is presumed non-predatory. 3 Conversely, under their model, any price
that falls below the marginal cost of production is considered preda-
tory.7 4 Under the Areeda-Turner test, when a firm prices at marginal
cost, only less-efficient firms will suffer larger losses per unit of output at
63. Both parties had stipulated that the relevant measure of cost is average variable
cost of production. Accordingly, the Court declined to resolve the conflict among the
circuit courts over the appropriate measure of cost. See id at 2587-88 & n. 1.
64. Idi at 2588 (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574, 589 (1986)); see id ("For the investment to be rational, the [predator] must have a
reasonable expectation of recovering, in the form of later monopoly profits, more than the
losses suffered.") (quoting Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588-89) (alteration in original); Cargill,
Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 119 n.15 (1986).
65. Brooke Group, 113 S. Ct. at 2588.
66. Id. at 2587 n.1.
67. See supra note 63.
68. See Areeda & Turner, supra note 54, at 709-16. The test proposed by Professors
Areeda and Turner has spawned considerable commentary. See supra note 61;
Hovenkamp, supra note 17, § 6.11, at 184-86.
69. See, e.g., Kelco Disposal, Inc. v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., 845 F.2d 404, 408
(2d Cir. 1988) (affirming jury verdict of attempted monopolization through predatory
pricing where evidence indicated that AVC was $81 per haul, and defendant had set fee at
$65 per haul), aff'd, 492 U.S. 257 (1989); see infra note 78.
70. Former Assistant Attorney General Thomas E. Kauper explained the Antitrust
Division's decision to dismiss the government's case against two major tire companies on
the ground that the government could not prove that defendants set prices below margi-
nal or average variable cost. See Williamson, supra note 50, at 285 n.5 (citing Memoran-
dum for Attorney General Edward Levi, February 23, 1976, reprinted in 5 Trade Reg.
Rep. (CCH) % 50,259 (Feb. 23, 1976) (relating to United States v. Firestone Tire & Rub-
ber Co., Civ. No. C-73-836, and United States v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Civ. No.
73-835 (N.D. Ohio 1976))).
71. See Areeda & Turner, supra note 50, at 1337-38.
72. See supra note 26 (discussing marginal cost).
73. See 3 Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Antitrust Law J 711d (1978).
74. See id
2062 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62
that price." Moreover, marginal cost pricing encourages efficient alloca-
tion of resources because the product's price reflects the true social cost
of the product. 6 Recognizing that business records rarely reflect margi-
nal costs of production, the Areeda-Turner model suggests the use of
average variable cost ("AVC") as an evidentiary surrogate." Many
courts have adopted variations of the Areeda-Turner AVC test.78
75. See Areeda & Turner, supra note 54, at 711.
76. See id.
77. Average variable cost ("AVC") is an effective substitute for marginal cost and
may be readily determined from records of cost data kept by most companies. See id. at
716; Northeastern Tel. Co. v. AT&T, 651 F.2d 76, 87 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 943 (1982). AVCs are defined as "the costs that vary with changes in output divided
by the output." International Air Indus., Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714,
724 n.27 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976). See infra notes 284-90 and
accompanying text.
78. See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2578,
2587 n. 1 (1993) (parties stipulated to AVC as the appropriate cost measure, adhering to
the Areeda-Turner test); Irvin Indus., Inc. v. Goodyear Aerospace Corp., 974 F.2d 241,
245 (2d Cir. 1992) (presuming occurrence of predatory pricing when seller prices below
"reasonably anticipated average variable cost"); Clamp-All Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe
Inst., 851 F.2d 478, 483 (Ist Cir. 1988) (finding that "ordinarily the measure of a 'preda-
tory price' is price below 'incremental cost'.... [where] the addition to total cost ... of
producing and selling additional output would exceed the return from selling that addi-
tional output") (citing Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 232-33
(1st Cir. 1983)), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1007 (1989); Henry v. Chloride, Inc., 809 F.2d
1334, 1346 (8th Cir. 1987) (finding sales above AVC are legal per se, and that AVC is "the
marker for rebuttable presumptions, with plaintiff holding burden above and the defend-
ant below"); Adjusters Replace-A-Car, Inc. v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., 735 F.2d 884,
889-90 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that plaintiff must demonstrate that the competitor is
either (1) charging a price below AVC, or (2) charging a price below short-run profit-
maximizing price where high barriers to entry exist), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1160 (1985);
D.E. Rogers Assocs. v. Gardner-Denver Co., 718 F.2d 1431, 1436-37 (6th Cir. 1983)
(holding that though AVC is generally a reliable test for predation, there are situations
where a competitor can be held liable for predatory pricing even if sales are above AVC),
cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1242 (1984); Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 698 F.2d
1377, 1388 (9th Cir.) (finding that price above AVC creates rebuttable presumption in
favor of defendant, and price below AVC creates rebuttable presumption in favor of plain-
tiff), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 955 (1983); Chillicothe Sand & Gravel Co. v. Martin Marietta
Corp., 615 F.2d 427, 432 (7th Cir. 1980) (holding that sales above AVC show that the
firm has "acted in an economically rational manner," but non-cost factors may be also
considered); Pacific Eng'g & Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d 790, 797 (10th
Cir.) (holding that prices above AVC were not predatory, though declining to adopt an
entirely cost-based test), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977). Cf Liggett Group, Inc. v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 964 F.2d 335, 339-40 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict properly granted to defendant because 12% market
share made recoupment impossible), aff'd sub nom. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Wil-
liamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2578 (1993); McGahee v. Northern Propane Gas Co.,
858 F.2d 1487, 1496 (1 1th Cir. 1988) (holding that test for predatory pricing must con-
sider subjective evidence and should use average total cost as the cost above which no
inference of predatory intent can be made), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1084 (1989); Stitt Spark
Plug Co. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 840 F.2d 1253, 1255-56 (5th Cir.) (reasoning that
predatory pricing requires ability to recoup losses after eliminating competitors by raising
prices above competitive levels), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 890 (1988).
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3. The Robinson-Patman Act
The Robinson-Patman Act of 193611 ("Robinson-Patman") expressly
forbids price discrimination ° where such conduct may8' substantially
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of com-
merce.82 Robinson-Patman case law is divided into two categories,
which are based on the injured competitor's position in the product's
chain of distribution. 3 First, Robinson-Patman prohibits primary-line
violations-discriminatory pricing policies that injure a competitor.'
Second, Robinson-Patman bars secondary-line violations-discrimina-
tory pricing policies that injure a seller's customers.8 5 The majority of
79. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13(b) (1988). The Robinson-Patman Act reads in pertinent
part:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of
such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between
different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where either or
any of the purchases involved in such discrimination are in commerce, where
such commodities are sold for use, consumption, or resale within the United
States... and where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to
injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or
knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of
either of them....
The Robinson-Patman Act is an amendment to § 2 of the Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 2, 38
Stat. 730, 730-31 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1988)).
The Clayton Act arose from dissatisfaction with early twentieth-century interpreta-
tions of the Sherman Act, lack of confidence in the Justice Department's ability to en-
force antitrust, and a perceived need for an administrative body to enforce the law and
keep American businesses apprised of which restraints of trade would be considered ac-
tionable under the Sherman Act. See Earl W. Kintner & Joseph P. Bauer, 3 Federal
Antitrust Law § 18.2 (1983).
The Clayton Act of 1914 places limits on price discrimination (see supra note 2), de-
fined as sales of the same product at different prices to similarly situated buyers (§ 2, as
amended by the Robinson-Patman Act). See id § 18.4. The Clayton Act also prohibits
exclusive dealing arrangements, and tying-making a sale of one product conditional on
the purchase of an additional or "tied" product (§ 3); see id. § 18.5. The Act places limits
on acquisitions of competing companies (§ 7); see id. 18.6; and prohibits interlocking
directorates--common board members among competing companies (§ 8); see id § 18.7.
The Act contains several other provisions relating to procedure and enforcement. See id.
§ 18.8.
80. See supra notes 2 & 79; Hovenkamp, supra note 17, § 13.1, at 338.
81. See Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726, 742 (1945) (holding that liability
under the Robinson-Patman Act does not require that price discrimination must cause
injury to competition, only that it "may" have such effect).
82. See supra note 79.
83. See Hugh C. Hansen, Robinson-Patman Law: A Review and Analysis, 51 Ford-
ham L. Rev. 1113, 1133 (1983).
84. See, e.g., Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct.
2578 (1993) (holding, after taking the unusual step of reviewing the sufficiency of evi-
dence, that the plaintiff failed to prove that defendant's volume sales to distributors at
discount constituted a Robinson-Patman violation); Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking
Co., 386 U.S. 685, 702 (1967) (holding that "[s]ellers may not sell like goods to different
purchasers at different prices if the result may be to injure competition").
85. See, eg., FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 39-44 (1948) (holding quantity
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Robinson-Patman causes of action are secondary-line claims. 86
Because Robinson-Patman prohibits price discrimination that injures
competition,87 a firm may be required to charge the same price to all
customers in a given market to avoid liability under the Act. This makes
predatory-pricing activity far more expensive, since a firm contemplating
predatory price cuts must lower prices equally in all markets, not just in
the market encompassing the competitors that the predator wishes to
eliminate. 8
The Robinson-Patman Act recognizes three types of injury to competi-
tion: (1) a deliberate and substantial lessening of competition,89 (2) a
tendency toward creating a monopoly,90 and (3) injury to, or prevention
or destruction of, competition with any person who either grants or
knowingly receives the benefit of the discrimination.9'
Courts today, guided by Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco92 and the Areeda-Turner test,93 apply various price-cost 94 analy-
ses to evaluate injury claims under the Robinson-Patman Act.95 In
discounts to large buyers illegal because of a reasonable probability of harm to buyers'
smaller competitors).
86. See Hansen, supra note 83, at 1134.
87. See supra note 79.
88. The Robinson-Patman Act has been criticized as harmful to consumers, because a
firm fearing liability under the act takes the course of least resistance: it sets prices at the
same level for all customers, rather than promoting competition through selective price
cuts. See Hansen, supra note 83, at 1190-93. For this reason, critics of the Act assert that
it promotes price rigidity among competitors within any particular market. See infra text
accompanying notes 281-83.
89. See supra note 79.
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. 113 S. Ct. 2578 (1993).
93. See supra text accompanying notes 68-78.
94. See supra notes 61, 67-78 and accompanying text.
95. The Supreme Court's decision in Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386
U.S. 685 (1967), was for many years the leading precedent for primary-line Robinson-
Patman claims. There the Court inferred injury to competition from a finding of preda-
tory intent without regard to price-cost analysis. See Hansen, supra note 83, at 1137.
Though not expressly overruled, Utah Pie is honored now only in the breach. See Brooke
Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2578, 2586-87 (1993).
Courts were applying traditional Sherman Act predatory-pricing analysis to Robinson-
Patman claims even before the Brooke Group decision. See, e.g., D.E. Rogers Assocs. v.
Gardner-Denver Co., 718 F.2d 1431, 1439 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding that "principles be-
hind proof of predatory intent in Sherman Act claims are equally applicable ... in a
Robinson-Patman suit") (internal quotations omitted), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1242 (1984);
William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1040-
41 (9th Cir. 1981) (equating predatory-pricing analysis in primary-line Robinson-Patman
cases with attempted monopolization claims under § 2 of the Sherman Act), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 825 (1982); 0. Hommel Co. v. Ferro Corp., 659 F.2d 340, 346- 47 (3d Cir. 1981)
(holding that competitive injury under the Robinson-Patman Act may be proven (1) di-
rectly through market analysis, or (2) by proving predatory intent from which injury
could be inferred. "In defining the scope of liability under the Robinson-Patman Act, the
larger goals of antitrust law must be considered."), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982);
Pacific Eng'g & Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d 790, 798 (10th Cir.) ("As it
applies to primary-line injury ... the Robinson-Patman Act should be interpreted no
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Brooke Group, the Supreme Court equated primary-line competitive in-
jury under the Robinson-Patman act with predatory pricing actionable
under section 2 of the Sherman Act.96 Accordingly, like section 2 analy-
sis, price discrimination is permitted under the Robinson-Patman Act
where price-cost analysis demonstrates the absence of predatory intent.97
The Robinson-Patman Act also provides three substantive defenses:
(1) "cost justification," (2) "meeting competition," and (3) "changing
conditions." The "cost-justification" defense expressly permits otherwise
unlawful price differentials where the costs of servicing one customer ex-
ceed the costs in servicing customers in different geographic markets,9
provided that the differentials "result[] from the differing methods or
quantities" in which the products are "sold or delivered." 99 Differences
in transportation costs, for example, may make it unrealistic for a pro-
ducer to service all markets at equal prices."° This defense reflects the
economic premise that a seller should not be required to charge an artifi-
cially high price to a particular buyer if it actually costs less to sell to that
buyer than to others. 10'
"Meeting competition" is another defense. Under section 2(b) of the
Act, 10 2 price differentials are justified if they are made in good faith 10 3 to
meet the equally low price of a competitor. This defense balances "the
restrictive provisions of the Robinson-Patman Act [with] the Sherman
Act's mandates for vigorous competitive pricing by sellers.""0 4 Although
differently from the Sherman Act."), cert denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977); International Air
Indus. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714, 720 n.10 (5th Cir. 1975) (noting that the
basic substantive issues raised by the Sherman and Robinson-Patman Acts "are identi-
cal" with respect to defining primary-line injury), cert denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976).
96. See Brooke Group, 113 S. Ct. at 2586-87.
97. See id. at 2587.
98. See 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1988). The statute reads in pertinent part:
[Nothing herein contained shall prevent differentials which make only due al-
lowance for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting
from the differing methods or quantities in which such commodities are to such
purchasers sold or delivered.
99. Id.
100. See, eg., American Motors Corp. v. FTC, 384 F.2d 247, 251 (6th Cir. 1967)
(finding discrimination justified based on selling and delivery cost savings), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 1012 (1968).
101. See Hansen, supra note 83, at 1145.
102. See 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1988). The statute reads in pertinent part:
That nothing herein... shall prevent a seller rebutting the prima-facie case...
by showing that his lower price or the furnishing of services or facilities to any
purchaser or purchasers was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of
a competitor, or the services or facilities furnished by a competitor. (emphasis
added).
103. Under the good faith standard, it is unnecessary to show that the price reduction
at issue actually met a competitive price so long as the seller can show a reasonable basis
for believing that it did. See Falls City Indus. v. Vanco Beverage, 460 U.S. 428, 439
(1983).
104. Frederick M. Rowe, Pricing and the Robinson-Patman Act, 41 Antitrust .J. 98,
98 (1971); see also Earl W. Kintner, A Robinson-Patman Primer 193 (2d ed. 1979) ("This
defense has the effect of sanctioning certain instances of discriminatory concessions and
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courts traditionally expressed hostility to the "meeting-competition" de-
fense, 105 the Supreme Court has favorably viewed the defense in recent
decisions." 6 Nevertheless, much discretion is left to the trier of fact in
evaluating the "good faith" of the seller in lowering prices to meet the
competition. 107
Finally, the "changing-conditions" defense'0 8 permits a seller to imple-
ment a differential pricing policy where a change in market conditions10 9
or in the marketability of the product occurs. "' The latter justification
for the defense has enjoyed more success than the former one."'
B. Trade Law: The Antidumping Statutes
This next section provides background on dumping and examines the
substance and procedure of the American antidumping statutes, with
emphasis on the Antidumping Act of 1921.
constitutes a congressional resolution to encourage 'hard competition'-lower prices-in
certain competitive situations even though, by definition, adverse competitive effects
continue.").
105. See Hansen, supra note 83, at 1151-52.
106. See, e.g., Vanco Beverage, 460 U.S. at 441 (holding that "the standard of good
faith is simply the standard of the prudent businessman responding fairly to what he
reasonably believes is a situation of competitive necessity") (internal quotations and cita-
tions omitted); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 U.S. 69, 82 (1979) ("The test for
determining when a seller has a valid meeting-competition defense is whether a seller can
show the existence of facts which would lead a reasonable and prudent person to believe
that the granting of a lower price would in fact meet the equally low price of a competi-
tor.") (internal quotations and citations omitted); United States v. United States Gypsum
Co., 438 U.S. 422, 451-53 (1978) (holding that a good faith belief, rather than absolute
certainty, that the price cut is being offered to meet a competitor's equally low price, is
the touchstone of the "meeting-competition" test). See generally Angela Nwaneri, Note,
The "Good Faith" Meeting Competition Defense to A Section 2(A) Violation of the Robin-
son-Patman Act: Area- Wide Pricing As A Valid Response to Competition, 14 Wm. Mitch-
ell L. Rev. 859 (1988) (evaluating the evidentiary requirements for applying the
"meeting-competition" defense where a seller confronts a competitor by reducing prices
in the entire area invaded or threatened). The author indicates a trend toward more
favorable judicial construction of the "meeting-competition" defense.
107. See Hansen, supra note 83, at 1150-51.
108. See 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1988). The statute provides in pertinent part:
That nothing herein shall prevent price changes from time to time where in
response to changing conditions affecting the market for or the marketability of
the goods concerned, such as but not limited to actual or imminent deteriora-
tion of perishable goods, obsolescence of seasonable goods, distress sales under
court process, or sales in good faith in discontinuance of business in the goods
concerned.
109. Though this exception is no longer strictly limited to the specific provisos within
the statute itself, the defense is limited to circumstances which are similar to those named
in the statute. See Moore v. Mead Serv. Co., 190 F.2d 540, 541 (10th Cir. 1951), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 902 (1952).
110. See Hansen, supra note 83, at 1154.
111. See id. at 1154 & nn.216-18. The few reported cases ruling on this defense usually
involve discontinued items. See, e.g., Comcoa, Inc. v. NEC Tel., Inc. 931 F.2d 655, 661
(10th Cir. 1991) (holding technological obsolescence of goods or introduction of new
product model constitute changed conditions).
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1. Varieties of Dumping and the American Statutory Response
Dumping takes three forms." 2 The first, sporadic dumping, generally
entails the disposal of an unexpected oversupply of merchandise in a for-
eign market as an alternative to a "fire sale" in the home market. '3  The
second type of dumping, intermittent, or short-term, is a more regular
practice than sporadic dumping, but it is nonetheless confined to a rela-
tively short period of time. 1 4 Producers may engage in intermittent
dumping to create customer goodwill, maintain foreign market share
during a recession in the home market, discourage or eliminate competi-
tion in the market, or retaliate against foreign competitors who dump
products in the producer's home market. I5 The third type of dumping,
continuous or long-term dumping, is defined as an ongoing practice to
maximize economies of scale 16 by maintaining full production."' It is
sometimes referred to as predatory dumping, though that term often re-
fers to continuous dumping through which the producer intends to in-jure, eliminate, or prevent competition in a foreign economy.""
Predatory dumping, of course, may also be intermittent." 9
The American antidumping laws seek to restrain foreign predatory be-
havior involving price discrimination between national markets.' 2 ° The
Antidumping Act of 1916121 provides a private right of action for victims
of trade dumping. The law rarely has been pleaded, however. In fact, it
was invoked only once, and unsuccessfully, during the first fifty years
following its passage,' 22 though pending legislation may revitalize it.'23
The Antidumping Act of 1921,124 also a source of considerable debate, is
112. See Pattison, supra note 6, §§ 1.021l][a]-[c], at 1-4 to 1-5.
113. See id § 1.02[l][a], at 1-4; N. David Palmeter, The Antidumping Law: A Legal
and Administrative Nontariff Barrier, in Down in the Dumps, supra note 8, at 64, 72(describing "targeted dumping" as "an isolated, rifle-shot export sale at a very low
price").
114. See Pattison, supra note 6, § 1.02[1][b], at 1-4 to 1-5.
115. See id
116. In some cases an increase in production lowers cost per unit of output becauseproduction at a higher level may be more efficient. An increase in efficiency accompany-ing higher output is known as an "economy of scale." See Hovenkamp, supra note 17,
§ 1.1, at 2.
117. See Pattison, supra note 6, § 1.02[l][c], at 1-5.
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. See supra note 6.
121. Act of Sept. 8, 1916, c. 463 § 801, 39 Stat. 798 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1988)).
122. See McGee, supra note 10, at 492 n.5 (citing Michael S. Knoll, United States
Antidumping Law: The Case For Reconsideration, 22 Tex. Int'l UJ. 265, 268 n.22(1987)).
123. Congress has recently considered proposed changes in the 1916 Act to encourage
its implementation. See supra note 7 (discussing Sen. Metzenbaum's proposed "Interna-
tional Fair Competition Act").
124. Pub. L. No. 67-1, ch. 14, tit. II, 42 Stat. 11 (1921) (codified as amended at 19
U.S.C. §§ 160-71 (1976) (repealed 1979)). The 1921 Act was reincorporated into theTrade Agreements Act of 1979, § 2, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144, 147-48 (1979) (codi-
fied at 19 U.S.C. § 2503 (1988)), as amended by Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 2948 (1984).
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the principal statute addressing dumping in the United States. Because
dumping is condemned as an unfair practice under the GATT, the
United States antidumping laws have a basis in international law.' 25
2. The Antidumping Act of 1921
The Antidumping Act of 1921 ("Antidumpiig Act") addresses the
dumping of merchandise 2 6 into the United States. The statute requires
the complainant to plead two elements: (1) sales by foreign producers in
the United States of commodities at "less-than-fair-value" ("LTFV"), 127
and (2) material injury, 128 the threat thereof,129 or material retardation 3
of the establishment of a domestic industry by the LTFV sales. The law
contains no intent requirement. Application of the Act involves elabo-
rate procedural guidelines.'
Antidumping provisions are codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673-1677k (1988 & Supp. III 1992)
["Antidumping Act"]. The Antidumping Act of 1921 was enacted amidst a national
xenophobic spirit. At the time of passage, shortly after World War I, concerns abounded
that Germany would launch an economic war to gain market share. See Bovard, supra
note 10, at 112-13 ("Congressmen declaimed that there was flotilla of merchant ships
loaded with German goods lurking a few miles outside of U.S. coastal waters, waiting to
deluge the American market with cheap goods. In reality, no such flotilla existed.").
125. See Waller, supra note 7, § 12.01, at 12-7 to 12-8. Antidumping provisions are
governed by Article VI of the GATT, which was substantially revised during the Uru-
guay Round of negotiations. See GATT 1993, supra note 14.
126. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1988); Patrick Sullivan, Antidumping Law & the Dumping
of Services, 24 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 1677 (1992) (documenting the growth in the
service sector of the global economy, arguing that the current antidumping laws do not
address the dumping of services, and suggesting revisions in the law to address services
provided by foreign firms at predatory prices).
127. 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1988).
128. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673(2)(A)(i) (1988); 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(A) (1988) (defining
"material injury" as "harm which is not inconsequential, immaterial, or unimportant").
129. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673(2)(A)(ii) (1988); 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(F) (1988) (defining
threat of material injury).
130. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673(2)(B) (1988); Dong Woo Seo, Material Retardation Stan-
dard in the US. Antidumping Law, 24 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 835 (1993).
131. PROCEDURE UNDER THE 1921 ACT
To initiate a dumping investigation, the complainant must simultaneously petition the
International Trade Administration ("ITA") of the Department of Commerce and the
International Trade Commission ("ITC"). See 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(b) (1988). The ITA
may also self-initiate an investigation. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
Nearly all cases begin by private petition. See Pattison, supra note 6, § 2.03, at 2-6. Any
"interested party" may bring a complaint before the ITA. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(9) (1988)
(defining "interested party"). Complaints are commonly brought by unions, representa-
tives of domestic manufacturers, and trade associations.
Within twenty days of the filing of the petition, the ITA must determine whether the
petition supports a preliminary finding of sales at LTFV, See 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(c)
(1988); 19 C.F.R. §§ 353.12-.13 (1993). The ITA must determine whether the petition
contains information reasonably available to the petitioner supporting the allegations.
See id. If the determination is affirmative, the ITC formally commences an investigation.
See 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(c)(2) (1988). If the determination is negative, the petition is dis-
missed. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(c)(3) (1988). The ITC then has forty-five days to make a
preliminary determination whether a domestic industry has been injured, threatened with
material injury, or the establishment of a domestic industry has been materially retarded
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Determining fair value 132 under the Act requires a direct comparison
of the American sale price 133 of a product with the price charged for that
product, or a "like product," 134 in the producer's home market, or, in
some cases, with the sale price of the product in the market of a third
country.' 35 The dumping margin is calculated by subtracting the price of
as a result of the importation of the merchandise allegedly being dumped. See 19 U.S.C.
§ 1673b(a) (1988). If at this time the ITC makes a negative determination, the investiga-
tion is terminated. See id Following a positive injury determination, the ITA has 160
days to make a preliminary determination, based on the "best information available,"
whether sales have been made at, or are likely to occur at, LTFV. 19 U.S.C.
§ 1673b(b)(1)(A) (1988). At this time a preliminary dumping margin is calculated. See
id The time period may be shortened to as little as 100 days for repeat offenders, see 19
U.S.C. § 1673b(b)(1)(B)(ii) (1988), and may be extended to 210 days for complex investi-
gations if the petitioner makes a timely request for an extension. See 19 U.S.C.
§ 1673b(c)(1) (1988). The ITA then has seventy-five days to render a final determination
of dumping margins. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(a)(1) (1988). The time allotted for final
determination may be extended for up to 135 days. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(a)(2) (1988).
The ITC has forty-five days from this date to make a final injury determination. See 19
U.S.C. § 1673d(b)(2)(B) (1988). In any event, the ITC must make this final injury deter-
mination within 120 days of its own preliminary injury findings. See 19 U.S.C.
§ 1673d(b)(2)(A) (1988). After a final affirmative determination, relief is granted in the
form of duty, equal to the dumping margin, imposed on the incoming product. The
importer must then post a cash deposit. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673e(a)(3) (1988). Posting of a
bond or other security is permitted in certain instances. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673e(c) (1988).
The Customs Department collects imposed duties. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673e(a)(1) (1988
& Supp. IV 1992). The dumping order issued governs incoming merchandise at least
until the foreign shipper can demonstrate two years of no LTFV sales. See 19 U.S.C.
§ 1675(b)(1),(2) (1988). Under the 1921 Act, dumping does not give rise to a private
right of action, so an aggrieved domestic producer is not directly compensated after a
final affirmative dumping determination. See supra note 7 (noting a recent proposal to
provide a viable private right of action for dumping).
132. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1988).
133. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677a (1988) ("United States price"); Harvey M. Applebaum &
David R. Grace, U.S. Antitrust Law and Antidumping Actions Under Title VII of the
Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 56 Antitrust L.J. 497, 502-07 (1987) (providing an over-
view of Commerce Department "fair value" investigations). The U.S. sale price of a
commodity is determined in one of two ways: "purchase price" is used when the ex-
ported commodity is purchased by an unrelated buyer prior to importation into the
United States. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(b) (1988 & Supp. 1994). When the foreign pro-
ducer and U.S. importer are related, the price at which the related party sells the com-
modity in the United States is used. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c) (1988); 19 C.F.R.
§ 353.10(c) (1993). This is known as the "Exporter's Sales Price" ("ESP"). Id. In both
cases, the relevant price is "that of the first arm's length transaction with respect to the
merchandise under review." Applebaum & Grace, supra, at 503. "The essential distinc-
tion between purchase price and ESP sales price is whether that arm's length transaction
takes place before or after importation" into the United States. Id
134. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(10) (1988 & Supp. 1994) (defining "like product"). See infra
Part II.C. and accompanying text, discussing problems in causation under the antidump-
ing laws, stemming in part from ITC analysis in making "like product" determinations.
135. See Applebaum & Grace, supra note 133, at 503-06 (reviewing "foreign market
value"). The "home market price" is not used in the comparison when the volume of
sales in the home market is "so small in relation to the quantity sold for exportation to
[countries other than the United States] ... that it is an inadequate basis for [determining
foreign market value]." 19 C.F.R. § 353.48(a) (1993). The cut-off point is 5%--when
home market sales equal less than 5% of the volume of exports to the United States, the
"home market" price is replaced in the comparison with the price of the commodity on
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the product on the American market from the home market price and
expressing the result as a percentage. For example, if Fuji sells film in
New York for $1 per roll and sells the same product in Tokyo for $1.50
per roll, it has made LTFV sales under current law.'3 6 A related issue in
determining fair value is the appropriate timing for making price com-
parisons because every dumping complaint necessarily relies on a foreign
exchange rate to establish the home market price in dollars.137 Because
exchange rates fluctuate daily, the same comparison may result in a
LTFV finding on one date and not on another.1 38 An antidumping com-
plaint also must assert material injury, or threat thereof, to an entire in-
dustry; injury to a single producer is insufficient.I39 Where a violation of
the Antidumping Act is found, the remedy under the Antidumping Act,
a duty equal to the "margin of dumping,"'" may be imposed.' 4 '
the markets of third countries. See id. In the absence of adequate sales in the United
States or third countries, fair value is instead based on a "constructed-value" analysis of
the producer's costs. See infra Part II.G.
Under the trade laws, below-cost sales by a foreign producer are not essential elements
of the dumping inquiry, unlike predatory-pricing analysis under the antitrust laws. See
supra notes 51-78 and accompanying text; 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(b) (1988 & Supp. 1994)
("Sales at less than cost of production"); 19 C.F.R. § 353.51 (1993) (providing that such
sales are disregarded in calculating foreign market value).
The trade laws also include provisions for determining fair value when the foreign
producer exports from a country with a non-market economy. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)
(1988 & Supp. 1994); 19 C.F.R. 353.52 (1993).
136. Thus: (home market price - United States price) - United States price = margin
of dumping, which is expressed as a percentage. Therefore, where the home market price
is $1.50 and the United States price is $1.00, the margin of dumping equals fifty percent.
This calculation, however, is biased in favor of finding a positive dumping margin: the
home market price is expressed as an average of sales over a six-month period. This
average price is then compared with individual sales prices in the United States, instead of
the average price of these sales over the same period. See infra Part II.D. (discussing this
statistical bias). See also John H. Jackson, Dumping in International Trade: Its Meaning
and Context, in Antidumping Law and Practice, A Comparative Study 2 (John H. Jack-
son & Edwin A. Vermulst ed., 1989) ["Comparative Study"].
137. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. 1994) (providing that the "foreign
market value" is the price in the home market at the time the merchandise is first sold in
the U.S.); see infra Part II.F.
138. See, e.g., James P. West, Comment, Currency Conversion in Antidumping Investi-
gations: The Floating Exchange Rate Dilemma, 16 N.C. J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 105
(1991) (focusing on the adaptations of the antidumping laws' currency conversion provi-
sions to a system of floating exchange rates and offering an alternative currency conver-
sion methodology); Steel AIIS President Sees Uncertainty For U.S. Steel Trade, MSA
Chances, 10 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 47, at 2008 (Dec. 1, 1993) (stating that at the
Multilateral Steel Agreement, negotiations discussions included the possibility of apply-
ing rolling averages to neutralize the effects of volatile exchange rates on dumping
margins).
139. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1988 & Supp. 1994). Since dumping petitions often result
in a finding of sales at LTFV, the success of a petition usually turns on the petitioner's
ability to prove injury-harm to domestic producers. See J. Michael Finger & Tracy
Murray, Policing Unfair Imports: The United States Example, 24 J. World Trade, Au-
gust 1990, at 39; Finger, supra note 14, at 37.
140. Pattison, supra note 6, § 1.03[3], at 1-12.
141. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1988).
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II. PROBLEMS WITH EXISTING ANTITRUST AND ANTIDUMPING
LAWS IN DEFINING AND DETERRING UNFAIR TRADE
This Part examines the extent to which the antitrust and antidumping
laws operate at odds, and the weaknesses of each in defining and deter-
ring injury from unfair foreign trade practices. This Part also illustrates
several aspects of the antidumping regime that have been criticized as
protectionist.
A. Jurisdictional Obstacles Inhibit Effective Application of Antitrust
Laws to Foreign Producers
The antitrust laws apply well-settled principles of economics to define
unfair trade. They employ price-cost tests and definitions of relevant
markets and market power to identify unfair trade practices.' 42 Yet, the
application of American antitrust laws to foreign predatory activity poses
significant jurisdictional obstacles. "Few subjects in international law
raise such incorrigible conflicts of interest as the exercise of extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction in the antitrust context."'' 43 In recent years, the United
142. See supra Part I.A.
143. Roger P. Alford, The Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Law. The United
States and European Community Approaches, 33 Va. J. Int'l L. 1, 1 (1992).
Application of the Sherman Act to anticompetitive activity abroad is predicated on the
Commerce Clause of the Constitution, which provides Congress with the power to regu-
late commerce with foreign nations. See U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. In interpreting the
constitutional limitations on application of the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court has held
that the Act extends to the full reach of the Commerce Clause. See Summit Health, Ltd.
v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 329 n.10 (1991) ("It is firmly settled that when Congress passed
the Sherman Act, it 'left no area of its constitutional power [over commerce] unoccu-
pied.' ") (citations omitted). The full scope of the Sherman Act has never been applied to
international trade, however, because of concerns for the potential impact on interna-
tional law, comity considerations, and possible retaliation by foreign governments against
American businesses operating abroad. See Waller, supra note 7, § 5.01, at 5-2. Thus far,
only one international tribunal has directly considered the extent of extraterritorial juris-
diction, and that decision did not delineate any clear boundaries. See S.S. "Lotus" (Fr. v.
Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9 (Sept. 7).
The Supreme Court has gradually expanded the jurisdiction of the Sherman Act over
foreign anticompetitive conduct. Compare American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.,
213 U.S. 347, 356-59 (1909) (holding that the antitrust laws do not reach conduct occur-
ring outside the United States); Id at 356 ("[Ihe general and almost universal rule is
that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law
of the country where the act is done.") with United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S.
268, 276 (1927) (holding that conduct occurring partly within the United States could
form the basis of an antitrust suit, though conspirators were aided by discriminatory
legislation abroad) and United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. ["Alcoa"], 148 F.2d 416,
443-44 (2d Cir. 1945) (Hand, J.) (abandoning the situs requirement altogether and in-
stead choosing as the jurisdictional test the intended effects in the U.S. market of the
complained-of pricing and production decisions). In Alcoa, Judge Hand reasoned that
agreements made outside of the United States have the same effect as similar agreements
entered into within the American border. Since "any state may impose liabilities, even
upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has conse-
quences within its borders which the state reprehends," id at 443, he concluded that
Congress intended to apply the Act to conduct abroad so long as the intended effect of
that conduct is prohibited by the Act; that is, economic effects within the United States
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States Department of Justice has increasingly asserted jurisdiction over
are indistinguishable from actual conduct within the nation's boundaries. Successive
courts interpreted the Alcoa "intended effects" test expansively, paying little attention to
intent. See Waller, supra note 7, § 5.03, at 5-4 n. 14. Foreign governments then retaliated
through legal and diplomatic channels and enactment of blocking statutes. See infra text
accompanying note 146.
The Second Restatement of Foreign Relations Law addressed perceived abuses of the
intended effects test. Section 18 of the Second Restatement held that a state has jurisdic-
tion to apply a rule of law attaching legal consequences to conduct occurring outside its
borders that has effects within its territory, if either (a) other states with reasonably devel-
oped legal systems recognize the conduct and its effect as constituent elements of a crime
or tort, or
(b)(i) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of activity to which the
rule applies; (ii) the effect within the territory is substantial; (iii) it occurs as a
direct and foreseeable result of the conduct outside the territory; and (iv) the
rule is not inconsistent with the principles of justice generally recognized by
states that have reasonably developed legal systems.
Restatement (Second) Foreign Relations Law § 18 (1965). Recognizing that more than
one state may have jurisdiction over a dispute, the American Law Institute opined that a
court should apply a balancing of interests test to avoid conflict between possibly contra-
dictory legal rulings. See id. § 40.
The court in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976)
["Timberlane I"], on appeal following remand, 749 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1984)
["Timberlane H"], cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1032 (1985), adopted a comity analysis based
on a balancing of American and foreign interests. The court rejected the intended effects
test for its failure to consider the interests of other nations. See Timberlane 1, 549 F.2d at
611-12. In its place, the court proposed a three-part test: (1) there must be a restraint
affecting or intended to affect foreign commerce of the United States, see id. at 613, (2) a
restraint of sufficient magnitude "to present a cognizable injury" to the plaintiff, id., and
(3) the court must consider the propriety of asserting extraterritorial jurisdiction as a
matter of international comity and fairness. See id. The court then set out several factors
for determining whether to exercise jurisdiction. See id. at 614-15. See also Mannington
Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297-98 (3d Cir. 1979) (setting out a
variation of the Timberlane test, using a ten-factor balancing of interests test); Restate-
ment (Third) Foreign Relations Law § 402 (1987) (codifying a variation on the
Timberlane test). The Third Restatement holds that a balancing of U.S. and foreign
national interests is required as an affirmative element of jurisdiction, and not merely as
an exercise in comity. See id. § 403(3). It provides for jurisdiction over conduct intended
to produce significant effects within a jurisdiction, or that in fact produced such effects, if
such jurisdiction is "reasonable." See id. §§ 402, 403(1). In addition, several factors are
set out to measure the reasonableness of jurisdiction in a given case. See id. § 403(2).
Courts have not universally endorsed the balancing of interests approaches set out in
Timberlane, Mannington Mills, and the Restatement. See, e.g., National Bank of Canada
v. Interbank Card Ass'n, 666 F.2d 6, 8 (2d Cir. 1981) (adopting a variation of the Alcoa
intended effects test, requiring proof of an actual anticompetitive effect "upon American
commerce, either foreign or interstate[,]" to confer jurisdiction over conduct occurring
outside the United States); In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248, 1254 (7th
Cir. 1980) (rejecting a defense under the act of state doctrine and applying the Alcoa
intended effects test); Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d
909, 945-53 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (rejecting both comity and interest balancing approaches,
the reviewing court affirmed the jurisdiction of the district court, finding that U.S. and
British courts shared concurrent jurisdiction). The defendants, instead of actively raising
all jurisdictional defenses in U.S. District Court, chose to initiate suits in foreign tribunals
solely to impede the district court's adjudication of the litigation. The case highlights the
United Kingdom's historical antipathy to U.S. antitrust policy affecting businesses based
in the U.K. One commentator has noted that the Laker case "suggests the inherent
limitations of a comity approach" to extraterritorial jurisdiction. Waller, supra note 7,
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foreign defendants whose conduct produces adverse economic effects in
the United States. 144 Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that the
antitrust laws may be applied to anticompetitive acts occurring abroad
even where a foreign state condones or openly encourages the activity at
issue. 145 Foreign sovereigns have reacted to this aggressive enforcement
of American antitrust laws by enacting retaliatory laws designed to
thwart the application of American antitrust laws to their nationals.
These statutes either restrict the production of documents ("discovery
blocking statutes") or the satisfaction of judgment ("judgment blocking
statutes").'" Accordingly, faced with a choice between bringing an anti-
trust action or a trade complaint, a plaintiff will almost invariably choose
to file a trade complaint to avoid such jurisdictional obstacles.' 47
B. The Antidumping Laws, However, Are Inexact in Determining
Intent to Injure, and Injury to, Competition
The trade laws escape the jurisdictional problems inherent in the extra-
territorial application of antitrust laws. 1 48 "Injury," as defined under the
antidumping laws, however, has no basis in economic theory, 49 because
§ 5.08, at 5-12. See also Jeffrey L. Snyder, International Competition: Toward A Norma-
tive Theory of United States Antitrust Law and Policy, 3 B.U. Int'l LJ. 257 (1985) (re-
viewing the Laker Airways decision and offering proposals for resolving international
antitrust conflicts); Marques Mendes, supra note 1, at 94-98 (discussing the defenses of
foreign sovereign immunity, act of state, and foreign sovereign compulsion).
144. See Waller, supra note 7, § 5.09, at 5-15 to 5-18. In fact, on April 3, 1992, the
Department of Justice ("DOJ") announced a change in antitrust enforcement policy: ex-
traterritorial enforcement of U.S. laws would be extended to foreign business activity
occurring abroad which harms U.S. exporters, if such conduct would have violated U.S.
law had it occurred domestically. See Lori B. Morgan & Helaine S. Rosenbaum, U.S.
Department of Justice Antitrust Enforcement Policy, 34 Harv. Int'l LJ. 192, 192 (1993)
(discussing the change in DOJ policy, likely reactions of foreign sovereigns, and the po-
tential diplomatic costs and deleterious long-run effects on foreign trade negotiations and
U.S. trade). This marked a departure from DOJ policy between 1988 and 1992, which
had precluded DOJ antitrust prosecutions of foreign business activity unless the anticom-
petitive conduct directly harmed consumers in the United States. See id.
Pilkington plc, a British manufacturer, was the first foreign target of the change in
DOJ policy. Pilkington, which dominates the world's $15 billion-a-year flat glass indus-
try, settled accusations of closing off foreign markets to U.S. rivals and strictly limiting
the use of commercial glass technology by American rivals, according to the proposed
consent decree, filed in the U.S. District Court for The District of Arizona. See British
Glass Manufacturer Settles Case Attacking Restrictions on U.S. Exporters, 66 Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1666, at 617 (June 2, 1994).
145. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Ca., 113 S. Ct. 2891, 2910 (1993) (" 'iThe fact
that conduct is lawful in the state in which it took place will not, of itself, bar application
of the United States antitrust laws,' even where the foreign state has a strong policy to
permit or encourage such conduct.") (quoting Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations
Law § 415, cmt. j (1987)).
146. See Waller, supra note 7, § 5.03, at 5-4 to 5-5 & n.15.
147. See Marques Mendes, supra note 1, at 166.
148. Under the trade proceedings, the ITA determines whether sales have fallen below
LTFV, the ITC determines injury, and the Customs Department assesses a duty on goods
as they arrive in the United States. See supra note 131.
149. See supra notes 17, 25, 51-78 and accompanying text; Cass, supra note 1, at 877
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the Commerce Department arrives at LTFV determinations without re-
gard to price-cost relationships.1 50 Under the antidumping laws, a peti-
tioner need not demonstrate that the respondent has either a specific
intent to monopolize, 51 a dangerous probability of success, or the ability
to affect market prices or to recoup losses from below-cost pricing, 5 2
even though predatory dumping is analogous to attempted monopoliza-
tion by predatory pricing, actionable under section 2 of the Sherman
Act. 53 Thus, the current antidumping regime permits a domestic pro-
ducer to obtain relief from efficient foreign competitors that encroach
upon the domestic producer's market power, a result clearly prohibited
under antitrust law.' 54 The antidumping laws also allow for affirmative
findings when the prices of goods imported into the United States are
below the average total cost of production, whereas an antitrust court
does not allow such a result without proof of predatory intent. 55 De-
spite the efforts of the Justice Department and Federal Trade Commis-
sion to encourage the Commerce Department to apply antitrust analysis
in trade cases, the Commerce Department has failed to do so.' 56 Thus, a
(noting that the primary difference between the antitrust and trade law approaches to
price discrimination and predation is the extent to which economic analysis informs their
respective processes); Davey, supra note 14, at 8-2, 8-4 to 8-17 (suggesting that the an-
tidumping laws have no basis in economic theory or under generally accepted principles
of international trade law); Elzinga, supra note 1, at 443 (referring to the "fair value" test
under the antidumping laws, Elzinga comments that "trade policy has an abiding con-
cern with costs economists perceive as bygones"); Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Dean Rusk
Center for International and Comparative Law, Antidumping and Countervailing Duties
and the GATT: An Evaluation and a Proposal for a Unified Remedy for Unfair Interna-
tional Trade 2 (1987) (declaring the antidumping laws an obstacle to efficient operation of
markets).
150. See supra notes 127-39 and accompanying text.
151. See, e.g., Applebaum, supra note 1, at 412 ("We should next put to rest the media
concept that predatory dumping exists. It may exist, but none of the trade laws require
any showing of predatory intent whatsoever." (citation omitted)). Applebaum notes that
when the ITC makes injury determinations, it does not consider the motives of foreign
producers, nor does the Department of Commerce consider motive in LTFV calculations.
See id. at 412-13.
152. See Cass, supra note 1, at 879-80 & n.7.
153. See supra notes 51-78 and accompanying text.
154. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 487-90 (1977)
(finding that where defendant's acquisitions did not produce anticompetitive result, plain-
tiff could not recover under antitrust laws for potential profits lost due to competitor's
entry into market and subsequent deconcentration of that market); Davey, supra note 14,
at 8-33 to 8-36 (noting that dumping complaints are almost invariably applied in the
United States to protect heavily concentrated industries).
155. See Richard Boltuck & Robert E. Litan, America's "Unfair" Trade Laws, in
Down in the Dumps, supra note 8, at 1, 10; Cass, supra note 1, at 879 n.7 (noting that
dumping may be found under current procedure even where prices of imported goods are
conclusively above the average variable cost of production).
156. See Applebaum & Grace, supra note 133, at 515-16 & n.82 (noting that the Anti-
trust Division of the Department of Justice appeared in at least nine antidumping investi-
gations between 1969 and 1975, urging the application of antitrust concepts in weighing
injury, particularly where the complaining U.S. industry was concentrated. These efforts
were largely in vain.). Applebaum and Grace also note that FTC attorneys have recently
appeared, to no avail, before the ITC and Commerce Department. See id. at 516-17.
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foreign producer may be penalized for injury to domestic producers even
though a foreign producer's pricing policy might reflect a legitimate reac-
tion to competition under well-settled principles of microeconomics. 57
Not surprisingly, many commentators assert that the antidumping laws
reflect an overriding concern with discouraging injury to specific compet-
itors in the marketplace. This is a result directly at odds with antitrust
law, which is concerned with injury to competition in general, rather
than injury to specific competitors.158
C. The Antidumping Laws Employ Inadequate Causation Analysis
The antidumping laws employ inadequate causation analysis in assess-
ing the effects of price discrimination on American producers of compet-
ing commodities.159 Such deficient analysis follows from the
International Trade Commission's failure to take a fact-driven, empirical
approach 1" to defining the relevant market,161 which consists of the pro-
ducers in the domestic industry affected by the complained-of dumping.
Just as defining the relevant market is a crucial step in antitrust analy-
sis,162 defining the relevant market in a dumping investigation is equally
essential. 63 Market definition under the antidumping laws is performed
on an ad-hoc basis,"' in contrast to antitrust market definition under the
Merger Guidelines. 65
In an antidumping investigation, the injured domestic industry is de-
fined as "the domestic producers as a whole of a like product, or those
producers whose collective output of the like product constitutes a major
proportion of the total domestic production of that product.'" The
term "like product" is then defined as "a product which is like, or in the
absence of like, most similar in characteristics and uses with, the article
subject to an investigation...."" This definition is circular.'6" Accord-
ingly, a foreign producer may be sanctioned and duties may be levied
157. See Cass, supra note 1, at 879-80 & n.7.
158. See supra note 23 and accompanying text; Finger, supra note 14, at 38 (noting
that "an objective definition of 'unfair' neither is nor ever has been the basis for determin-
ing when the U.S. government will act against imports").
159. See Cass, supra note 1, at 881.
160. See id
161. Seesupra note 25; see also Merger Guidelines, supra note 17, 9 13,103, at 20,551-
552.
162. See supra note 25.
163. See Cass, supra note 1, at 881-84.
164. See Kelly, supra note 25, at 892-97. Kelly analogizes the current ITC methodol-
ogy for defining the aggrieved domestic industry to antitrust definitions of "relevant mar-
ket" prior to 1982, governed by Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325
(1962).
165. See Merger Guidelines, supra note 17, 13,103, at 20,551-552.
166. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(4)(A) (1988).
167. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(10) (1988). Compare market definition under the Merger
Guidelines, applying the "five-percent" test. See supra note 25.
168. See N. David Palmeter, Injury Determinations in Antidumping and Countervailing
Duty Cases--A Commentary on U.S. Practice, 21 J. World Trade L., Feb. 1987, at 14-15.
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against that producer's products, even though the foreign producer is not
competing with the petitioning domestic industry at all. Hence, the
ITC's determinations of "domestic industry" and "like product" may
cause illogical and unjust results. 169
D. The Less-Than-Fair- Value Calculus Raises Numerous Concerns
As previously discussed, the Commerce Department computes a
dumping margin on an individual sale in the United States by subtracting
the price of the commodity to a customer in the United States from its
foreign market price. The result is expressed as a percentage of the
United States price. "0 These calculations, however, are replete with sta-
tistical biases in favor of finding that dumping has occurred. 171 For ex-
ample, two elements of the Commerce Department's measurement rules
substantially increase the probability that foreign producers will be found
to have made sales at LTFV. First, in arriving at LTFV calculations, the
Commerce Department discards the offsetting effect of a foreign pro-
ducer's American sales at prices exceeding the foreign market price (a
"negative dumping margin").172 Second, in arriving at the foreign pro-
169. One commentator illustrates the problems associated with defining "like
product":
A galvanized carbon steel sheet is not "like" an ungalvanized carbon steel
sheet, but a galvanized carbon steel wire nail is "like" an ungalvanized carbon
steel wire nail.
Carbon steel wire rope and stainless steel wire rope are like products, as are
galvanized and ungalvanized wire rope, but a porcelain-coated carbon steel
cooking pan is not "like" a stainless steel cooking pan-yet all stainless steel
pans are "like products", even though they may be combined with other metals
such as copper or aluminum. Carbon steel wire rod and stainless steel wire rod,
however, apparently are not "like products."
Pipe that is welded is not "like" pipe that is seamless, unless the pipe is for
use by the oil industry. In the pipe industry the contrasts indeed are extreme.
Circular standard pipes are not "like" circular line pipes. But all pipes destined
for the oil industry are considered one "like product." Thus, "oil well tubing",
which is used to conduct oil or gas to the surface of the earth; "drill pipe",
which is used to transmit power from the surface to the drilling point below the
surface; "casing" which surrounds these and prevents the sides of the hole from
collapsing during the drilling; and a semi-finished product called "green tube"
all are one "like product."
Id. at 15-16 (citations omitted). See also Bovard, supra note 10, at 119-20 (illustrating
some absurdities resulting from some of the Commerce Department's past "like product"
determinations, citing, for example, a decision that equated new forklifts sold in Japan
with three-year old forklifts sold in the United States).
170. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
171. See generally Down in the Dumps, supra note 8 (documenting the litany of proce-
dural abuses inherent in the Commerce Department's investigations). The authors note
that these procedures are biased toward finding higher margins of dumping, and therefore
higher import duties, and that, in some cases, such biases violate the GATT. These au-
thors contend that many of these biases can easily be removed through changes in admin-
istrative practice, without legislative change.
172. Several commentators have documented this procedural bias. See, e.g., N. David
Palmeter, The Antidumping Law: A Legal and Administrative Nontariff Barrier, in Down
in the Dumps, supra note 8, at 64, 71; Schoenbaum, supra note 149, at 13-14.
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ducer's "home market price," the Commerce Department calculates an
average of the price of the product in the home market over a six-month
period.173 This average is then compared with the prices for individual
sales of the like product in the United States over the same period.' 74
Since any negative margins are discarded in the analysis, and the six-
month average price of the commodity in the home market is compared
with the price on individual sales to customers in the United States, the
Commerce Department may find positive dumping margins even where
ihe average price charged by an importer to American consumers meets
or exceeds the average price charged in the home market.' 7  A simple
example illustrates these biases in favor of finding positive dumping
margins.
176
E. The Best-Information-Available Provision Is Prejudicial to the
Foreign Respondent
The best-information-available provision is a default rule governing
173. See 19 C.F.R. § 353.42(b) (1993) (declaring that antidumping investigations en-
compass an importers's sales in the United States and in the home market for the previ-
ous six months); N. David Palmeter, The Antidumping Law: A Legal and Administrative
NontariffBarrier, in Down in the Dumps, supra note 8, at 64, 71 (demonstrating, through
specific examples, statistical biases in LTFV calculations).
174. See Cass, supra note 1, at 880-81.
175. See Applebaum & Grace, supra note 133, at 506; N. David Palmeter, The An-
tidumping Law: A Legal and Administrative Nontariff Barrier, in Down in the Dumps,
supra note 8, at 64, 72 (noting that the Commerce Department may overcome this bias in
computing the dumping margins simply by comparing averages of home-market sales
prices with averages of U.S. sales prices, but that opponents of this revision argue that it
does not deter "targeted dumping," also known as "spot," or "rifle-shot" dumping. This
practice is described as "an isolated, rifle-shot export sale at a very low price."). Id. at 72.
U.S. producers trading solely in the domestic market, however, often engage in price
discrimination for legitimate reasons, for example, to respond to fluctuations in supply
and demand. See Richard Boltuck & Robert E. Litan, America's "Unfair" Trade Laws,
in Down in the Dumps, supra note 8, at 1, 14; Bovard, supra note 10, at 120-22 (demon-
strating, through specific examples, the bias in the Commerce Department's averaging).
Revisions in Article VI of the GATT disallow comparisons of average sales prices with
individual sales prices in most cases. See GATT 1993, supra note 14.
176. The "weighted-average dumping margin" is calculated by dividing the total dollar
value of the producer's margins by the total dollar value of its U.S. sales. "Negative
margins," however, are disregarded in the analysis. For example:
Foreign Market Value U.S. Sales/U.S. Price Dumping Margins
S100/unit* 10 units at $75 each 33% (S25/unit)
10 units at $100 each 0% (SO/unit)
10 units at $125 each -20% (-S25/unit)
* In this example, the foreign market value of S100/unit is the average of thirty
sales in the home market over a six month period: ten at S133/unit, ten at
$100/unit, and ten at $67/unit. This average is then compared to the prices of
individual U.S. sales.
The weighted-average dumping margin is thus calculated:
Total dollar value of margins = 10 X 25 = S250
Total dollar value of U.S. sales = 750 + 1000 + 1250 = $3,000
Weighted-average dumping margin = 250/3000 = 8.34%
See Applebaum & Grace, supra note 133, at 506.
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antidumping investigations. It provides that when a foreign producer re-
fuses or is unable to provide information requested by the Commerce
Department during an antidumping investigation, the Commerce De-
partment will rely upon the best information otherwise obtainable. 177 In
practice, this means that the Commerce Department will use the infor-
mation provided by the complaining domestic industry, 78 which is natu-
rally most unfavorable to the foreign producer. Several commentators
have recognized the onerous burden 179 on a foreign producer in defend-.
ing an antidumping claim, noting that investigations require massive
amounts of data to be presented in an extremely short amount of time in
accordance with demanding rules of form.18 In recent years, the Com-
merce Department has significantly raised the documentation require-
ments of responding to antidumping complaints.' In fact, several
recent cases demonstrate the inability of major multinational companies
to meet the document demands of the Commerce Department. 82 Conse-
quently, foreign respondents find that the Commerce Department adopts
the complaining domestic industry's information simply because the re-
spondent cannot produce all the required information within Commerce
Department deadlines. This provision has attracted considerable criti-
cism, 83 and the now-completed negotiations of the GATT at the Uru-
guay Round, if implemented by Congress, would limit its use.' 84
177. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(c) (1988).
178. The Commerce Department has stated that "[t]he best information available may
include the factual information submitted in support of the petition or subsequently sub-
mitted by interested parties." 19 C.F.R. § 353.37(b) (1993).
179. See supra note 131 and accompanying text, documenting the elaborate procedural
framework of the Antidumping Act and strict statutory time limits.
180. See N. David Palmeter, The Antidumping Law: A Legal and Administrative
Nontariff Barrier, in Down in the Dumps, supra note 8, at 64, 67-69 & nn.9-12 (noting
that, among other requirements, all sales data must be submitted on nine-track computer
tape, specifically coded with "either EBCDIC or BCD alphanumeric," capabilities which
are not available to every foreign respondent). Some companies, simply because of their
own in-house iecord-keeping procedures, find these requirements impossible to meet. See
id. at 70 & n.16. Respondents who cannot comply with these requirements risk having
the Commerce Department reject their responses and make decisions based on the "best
information available."
181. See id. at 70 (noting that some respondents find that "[tihe administrative burden
simply of furnishing the required information within the required time in the required
form ... [is] overwhelmingly difficult").
182. Many commentators view the Commerce Department's deadlines as unreasona-
ble. See id. (noting that Matsushita, Mitsui, SKF, and Toshiba were unable to meet
Commerce's information requirements).
183. See, e.g., Schoenbaum, supra note 149, at 1.
184. See Latin America: Brazil's Government Lauds Uruguay Round; But Private Sec-
tor Reaction Remains Mixed, 10 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 50, at 2140 (Dec. 22, 1993)
(noting that the provision was frequently applied against Brazilian steel exporters in
1993, with damaging (and arguably unfair) consequences). Revisions in Article VI of the
GATT place limits on applying the "best information available" provision. See GATT
1993, supra note 14.
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F. Current Commerce Department Procedures Permit a Finding That
a Foreign Producer Is Liable for Dumping Solely on the Basis
of Exchange Rate Fluctuations
The LTFV determination requires a direct comparison of domestic
and home market sales prices of the "like product."'' 8 5 Fluctuations in
the exchange rates affect this determination 86 --a decline in the value of
the dollar on world currency markets can create an apparent increase in
the home market price. 187 Accordingly, a foreign producer may be liable
for dumping when the dollar declines in value, though neither the Ameri-
can nor the foreign sales price has changed. 88
In dumping investigations, the Commerce Department adopts the ex-
change rates set quarterly by the Federal Reserve Bank. 8 9 The Com-
merce Department does not depart from the Federal Reserve quarterly
exchange rates unless, on any particular day, the daily rate 90 varies more
than five percent from the Federal Reserve quarterly rate."9 ' In that
case, the Commerce Department applies the daily rate. 92 The Com-
merce Department exchange rate policy, however, may cause some un-
185. See supra text accompanying notes 132-36.
186. See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text. Proposed changes in the GATT
at the recently completed Uruguay Round would curtail such abuses.
187. See Keith Bradsher, Kodak Asks 275% Tariffs on Some Fuji Imports, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 1, 1993, at D1 (noting that Kodak's request for steep tariffs is one of the first major
cases where an American competitor argues that a Japanese producer should raise prices
to reflect the yen's rise against the dollar, and that petitions by other major American
manufacturers may follow).
188. The following example illustrates how fluctuations may artificially create the ap-
pearance of dumping: dumping is currently determined by comparing the price of a com-
modity in the United States with its "home market" price.
home market price
units of foreign currency per - equivalent US price
SCENARIO A (NO DUMPING VIOLATION):
S1 = 100y
1 roll FUJI film, in Tokyo, costs 100Y, the equivalent of S1.
1 roll of FUJI film is sold for S1 on the US market.
The US price, S1, is not less than 100Y, the "home market" price. Therefore, under
current law, no dumping has occurred.
SCENARIO B (DUMPING VIOLATION):
$1 = 50Y
1 roll FUJI film, in Tokyo, costs 100Y, now equivalent to 52.
1 roll of FUJI film is sold for $I on the US market.
The US price, S1, is less than 100Y, the "home market" price. Therefore, under current
law, dumping occurs simply when the dollar falls relative to the yen, though neither the
U.S. nor the home market price has changed.
189. See N. David Palmeter, Exchange Rates and Antidumping Determinations, 22 J.
World Trade, Apr. 1988, at 73, 74.
190. The daily rate is the rate determined on world currency exchanges by market
forces. These rates fluctuate daily, and are quoted in financial newspapers. Thus the
daily rate will often differ from the Fed's established quarterly rates.




warranted findings of dumping: the Commerce Department departs
from the quarterly Federal Reserve rate only if the fluctuation between
the pre-set quarterly rate and the daily rate exceeds five percent. To be
considered evidence of dumping, however, a foreign producer's sale price
on the American market need be only 0.5% lower than the home market
price, or one-tenth of the exchange rate fluctuation necessary to trigger
an adjustment of the rate that the Commerce Department applies to eval-
uate a dumping petition.19 a Accordingly, the Commerce Department
may find a foreign producer liable for dumping solely on the basis of
exchange rate fluctuations. 194
G. Bias Is Implicit in the Commerce Department's
Constructed- Value Analysis
The Commerce Department's constructed-value' 95 analysis is a
method of estimating the equivalent of the home-market price of a prod-
uct by approximating the product's cost of production. The Department
applies constructed-value analysis as a surrogate when it finds that home-
market or third-country sales are insufficient to determine accurately the
sale price of the product in the home market. Constructed-value analy-
sis, however, is biased against foreign respondents. For example, the reg-
ulations governing constructed-value determinations presume that the
foreign producer has administrative costs of at least ten percent of pro-
duction costs, and a profit of at least eight percent of total production
costs, on any sales in the United States. 196 By presuming an eight per-
cent profit for a foreign producer's sales in the United States, the con-
structed-value analysis declares a foreign firm liable for dumping simply
for earning a low profit on the American sales. Ironically, the ITC's own
studies indicate that average pre-tax profits for American corporations
are six percent of sales. 197 Further, by presuming that foreign producers
have administrative costs of at least ten percent of total production costs,
the constructed-value analysis actually punishes a foreign producer for
being efficient.
H. The Preparation of an Antidumping Petition Raises
Antitrust Concerns
It is often desirable, even necessary, for a domestic industry to pursue
an antidumping case collectively as a class constituting all producers in
193. See id. (noting that any weighted-average dumping margin of less than 0.5% is
disregarded as de minimis).
194. See Bovard, supra note 10, at 116-19 (describing specific cases where foreign pro-
ducers were found liable for dumping on the basis of exchange rate fluctuations or hyper-
inflation in the home market). See also GATT 1993, supra note 14. (providing that
exporters must be allowed at least 60 days to adjust export prices to reflect exchange rate
fluctuations).
195. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(2) (1988); 19 C.F.R. § 353.50 (1993).
196. See 19 C.F.R. § 353.50(a)(2) (1993).
197. See Bovard, supra note 10, at 126-31.
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the relevant market. Such collective action requires domestic producers
to exchange pricing and other sensitive market information.""8 Yet, in-
formation exchanges may be aper se199 violation of section I of the Sher-
man Act, unless precautions are taken to ensure that individual firms do
not have access to the information required to complete the industry-
wide antidumping petition.2 "0
In fact, the mere filing of an antidumping complaint itself is considered
a form of Noerr-Pennington20° abuse in certain circumstances. 0 2 The
filing of petitions may produce a powerful chilling effect on imports. A
domestic industry's initiation of proceedings costs foreign producers sub-
stantial out-of-pocket expenses.20 3 The documentation necessary to re-
spond to an antidumping petition is formidable. 2' Further, foreign
producers cannot assess their total potential liabilities until the termina-
tion of proceedings or the end of an administrative review, a process that
may take as long as two years. 20 5 Faced with such costs, a foreign pro-
ducer may cease exports voluntarily, regardless of the merits of the do-
mestic producer's antidumping petition. 2 6 Not surprisingly, unfair
trade cases "have become the usual first choice for industries seeking pro-
tection from imports into the U.S."20 7 Indeed,
[a]nti-dumping suits are emerging as the chemical weapons of the
world's trade wars. Invisible, compounded of apparently innocuous
industrial trading policies, and, in their current use, deadly, they have
become a favourite way of protecting domestic industries against Japa-
nese and South Korean imports.... The mere threat by a government
of an anti-dumping investigation, GATT officials reckon, can often be
enough to persuade exporters to acquiesce in bilateral price-rigging or
trade-restraining deals of dubious legality.208
Settlement of antidumping disputes has antitrust implications as well:
198. See d'Esclapon, supra note 11, at 551.
199. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
200. See d'Esclapon, supra note 11, at 551 (noting that producers filing joint petitions
must appoint an independent party to collect necessary sales and price information).
201. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
202. See d'Esclapon, supra note 11, at 549-51 (noting that improper use of the an-
tidumping laws through the filing of baseless petitions may fall within the sham exception
to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine).
203. See id. at 549; Schoenbaum, supra note 149, at 2 ("Defense of an antidumping...
action typically is expensive and requires years of effort. For all but the larger foreign
exporters, the threat of becoming entangled in such an action is a formidable barrier to
entering the American market. Domestic industries can easily use these laws for protec-
tionist purposes and to harass competitors.").
204. See supra Part II.E.
205. See d'Esclapon, supra note 11, at 548.
206. See id. at 548-49; Schoenbaum, supra note 149, at 2 & n.15 (noting that foreign
chemical, steel, textile, and color television industries have been the objects of harassment
by continuous filings).
207. Gary N. Horlick & Geoffrey D. Oliver, Antidumping and Countervailing Duty
Law Provisions for the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 23 J. World
Trade, June 1989, at 5.
208. The Anti-Dumping Dodge, The Economist, Sept. 10, 1988, at 77.
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such negotiations often involve the exchange of price and output infor-
mation between producers. Industry groups and trade negotiators,
aware of the antitrust implications inherent in settlement of trade dis-
putes, often seek Department of Justice Antitrust Division opinion letters
or advice on the extent to which they may participate in such
negotiations.2 °9
I. Commentators Criticize the Antidumping Regime on Numerous
Other Grounds
In addition to recognizing the antidumping laws' potential for abuse,
some argue that the antidumping law remedies waste administrative and
legal resources 210 in a manner disproportionate to the benefits of the
available remedy-the imposition of a duty affecting a relatively low vol-
ume of trade.21' Further, consistent with existing LTFV analysis, the
foreign respondent easily may evade a duty simply by lowering prices in
the home market until they are equal to the price of the product in the
United States, an approach that has absolutely no effect on price levels in
the American market.212 Finally, the Supreme Court and some commen-
tators have maintained that the success of foreign predation-or any pre-
dation, for that matter-is remote in the long run.2 13 Thus, under this
theory, the "antidumping laws have become, at least in part, guises for
protectionism, ' '2 14 products of power politics, 215 and smoke screens for
rent-seeking216 activity. Similarly, others argue that dumping causes
209. See Applebaum, supra note 1, at 415.
210. Responding to an antidumping petition involves significant costs. See Bovard,
supra note 10, at 134-38. Naturally, a respondent will weigh the cost of preparing all
requested documents and securing counsel in deciding whether to remain in the U.S.
market at all. For example, Matsushita Electric reportedly abandoned over $50 million
in telephone system exports during the Commerce Department's 1989 investigation of
small business telephone systems. See id. at 135-36. "The straw that reportedly broke
Matsushita's back occurred when Commerce officials commanded the company on a Fri-
day afternoon to translate 3,000 pages of Japanese financial documents and present inves-
tigators with English versions on the following Monday morning." Id. at 136. Of course,
barring full compliance, Matsushita would fall prey to the "best information available"
rule. See supra Part II.E. Matsushita's experience is yet another example of the adminis-
trative burdens in answering an antidumping complaint and the consequent "chilling ef-
fect" on competition, even where the petition lacks a factual basis.
211. See Schoenbaum, supra note 149, at 2-3 (noting that "[m]ost of the actions initi-
ated are in a narrow range of industries who have repeatedly invoked them: ferrous
metals, textiles, chemicals, rubber and plastic materials").
212. See Applebaum, supra note 1, at 413 (noting the inconsistency between this result
and the concept of predatory intent).
213. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588-89
(1986); Davey, supra note 14, at 8-10 to 8-12.
214. Sullivan, supra note 126, at 1707 (internal citation omitted); Bovard, supra note
10, at 1 (arguing that "fair trade," a favored buzzword among legislators, is synonymous
with "one of the greatest intellectual frauds of the twentieth century").
215. See Finger, supra note 14, at 43.
216. See Elzinga, supra note 1, at 439. Rent-seeking, as Elzinga defines the concept, is
the use of state power to increase one's own wealth at the expense of another. In this
context, it means that a domestic producer with market power may reap supracompeti-
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only negligible effects on domestic industries"" or the economy as a
whole.218
Many commentators assert that the antidumping laws are irreconcila-
bly at odds with antitrust laws and should be revised or eliminated
completely.219
J. Current Antidumping Statutes, However, Fail to Deter Predation by
Well-Funded Foreign Trusts
Domestic industries continue to lobby for a private right of action for
dumping.220 American manufacturers claim that foreign producers ex-
ploit market power at home and expand their presence abroad by dump-
ing commodities into other markets.221 Government protection from
foreign competitors and under-enforcement of competition law at home
purportedly allow concentrated 222 industries to maintain market power
in the home market, impose monopoly prices, and reap supracompetitive
profits.223 This phenomenon is wel-documented.224 In turn, supracom-
petitive profits at home fund below-cost sales of excess supply in the
tive profits at the expense of (1) consumers, a relatively diffuse group, and (2) foreign
producers, which, as politically disenfranchised groups, may be unable to exert the same
amount of influence on policymakers as the domestic producers. See id. at 439-40.
217. See Morris E. Morkre & Kenneth Kelly, Perspectives on the Effects of Unfair
Imports on Domestic Industries, 61 U. Cin. L. Rev. 919, 944 (1993).
218. See Schoenbaum, supra note 149, at 3 ("Because the volume of trade affected [is]
minor in aggregate terms, the abolition of these laws would hardly be noticed in
macroeconomic terms.").
219. See, e.g., Barcel6, supra note 14, at 78 (arguing that the antidumping laws are
unnecessary because § 2 of the Sherman Act and the Trade Act of 1974 together ade-
quately deter predatory dumping); Davey, supra note 14, at 8-41 (suggesting that applica-
tion of dumping laws should be applied only where the complaining domestic industry is
unconcentrated, should be only a temporary remedy, and ideally, should be abolished by
international agreement); Schoenbaum, supra note 149, at 3 ("The proper solution would
be to eliminate these laws entirely and merge their beneficial aspects into a new, single
unified remedy for unfair international trade practices."); Wood, supra note 10, at 1155.
220. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text; Raymond M. Galasso, Note, The
Conspiracy of Below-Cost Sales- Wake Up America, Take the Offensive, and Start Suing
Unfair Foreign Competitors, 70 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 409 (1993) (encouraging increased
litigation under § 2 of the Sherman act against foreign competitors who engage in below-
cost sales to gain market share in the United States).
221. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
222. See supra note 25.
223. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (describing allegations by domestic steel
producers that foreign steel manufacturers, including producers from the European Com-
munity, Japan, Korea, and Southeast Asia, are involved in widespread cartel activity).
224. See Robert L. Cutts, Capitalism in Japan: Cartels and Keiretsu, Harv. Bus. Rev.
48 (Jul.-Aug. 1992). Cutts documents the proliferation of cartels in Japan, built upon
tightly-woven interrelationships between businesspeople, bureaucrats, and political par-
ties, a phenomenon known as keiretsu. Cutts also notes that "[h]undreds of cartels estab-
lished to set prices, rationalize industries, and respond to depressed markets.., have
been permitted by law and even supervised by the government." Id. at 49. Naturally,
consumers suffer with higher prices. See id. at 50 (noting, for example, that Japanese
farmers pay 30% to 40% more than they would in a free market for equipment and
supplies); Galasso, supra note 220, at 409-12, 420-21.
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American market. Below-cost sales enable these sellers to gain more of
the American market at the expense of American producers.225 Conse-
quently, American trade laws are justified as an attempt to harmonize
differing economic systems between nations.226
The antidumping laws partially compensate for the shortcomings of
antitrust law in policing foreign predation.227 Antitrust law was estab-
lished at a time when American firms competed only with other domestic
producers.228 Today, American firms face widespread competition from
European and Asian producers. Antitrust'law has been relatively unsuc-
cessful in deterring predatory activity by these recent entrants into the
American market.229 Thus, antidumping laws may be the only currently
viable remedy available to American companies confronting anticompeti-
tive behavior originating overseas.23 °
Absent effective policing of foreign predatory activity, some commen-
tators suggest that foreign oligopolies might eventually replace competi-
tive American firms. This alarms proponents of strict antidumping laws:
The random working of the theory of comparative advantage in a
highly unstable family of nations can lead to industrial imbalances
with serious geopolitical implications.
The real question, therefore, is not whether the antidumping laws
inhibit competition, but whether they are adequate, in their current
form, to respond to anticompetitive behavior by foreign producers.23'
Proponents of strict antidumping laws note that the consumer's short-
term interest in buying low-priced products conflicts with the longer-
term national interest in ensuring healthy domestic industries.232 A pre-
occupation with low consumer prices, they assert, encourages an ulti-
225. See Questions and Answers, supra note 12, at 457-59 (debating the extent to which
foreign predation may have caused the demise of the domestic dynamic-random-access-
memory ["DRAM"] semiconductor industry. DRAMs are a key component in com-
puters today.).
226. See Gilbert B. Kaplan & Susan H. Kuhbach, The Causes of Unfair Trade: Trade
Law Enforcers' Perspective, 56 Antitrust L.J. 445, 450 (1987).
227. See John D. Ong, The Interface of Trade/Competition Law and Policy: A Busi-
nessman's Perspective, 56 Antitrust L.J. 425, 427-29 (1987) (arguing that the trade laws
guard against a realistic threat of monopolization of domestic markets by foreign entities,
and that they provide a viable short-term deterrent to such activity until trade-related
changes can be made in the antitrust laws).
228. See id.; Victor, Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 463-64 (noting that the na-
tion's economy has long been driven by encouraging competition, both domestic and
foreign, yet domestic industries were unable to contend with the sudden infusion of for-
eign goods beginning in the mid-1960s).
229. See supra notes 143-147 and accompanying text (discussing extraterritorial appli-
cation of U.S. antitrust laws); Ong, supra note 227, at 427-29.
230. See Ong, supra note 227, at 429.
231. Id. at 430.
232. See Alfred E. Eckes, The Interface of Antitrust and Trade Laws-Conflict or Har-
mony? An ITC Commissioner's Perspective, 56 Antitrust L.J. 417, 423-24 (1987) (noting
that dumping contributes to misallocation of resources between economies, and that sub-
sidies promote inefficiency in the export market and "export" unemployment, and that
low consumer prices in the short run precede high prices in the long run).
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mate reduction in the pool of domestic competition, thus stifling
domestic industrial development and the profitability and cash flow re-
quired to generate new products. 233 Eventually, consumers are also in-
jured because competition in a given product market declines and prices
rise as market concentration 234 increases.235 Further, as foreign produ-
cers gain domestic market share at the expense of domestic producers,
unemployment may rise.236
K. Trade Laws Serve Many Vital Functions
The overriding policy objective of antitrust law is to ensure the com-
petitiveness of markets.2 37 Trade laws, however, serve several different
functions, only one of which is the promotion of free and fair competi-
tion. Trade laws assist in preserving national security, enhancing Ameri-
can economic power, promoting foreign policy objectives, protecting
American producers in the domestic market, enhancing the competitive-
ness of American firms in international markets, preserving and ex-
panding domestic employment opportunities, protecting and promoting
domestic advantages in technology, regulating international trade prac-
tices perceived as unfair, and promoting free trade and competition when
not injurious to American interests.238 Antidumping laws play a particu-
larly important role in encouraging other nations to open their markets,
especially where non-tariff barriers currently limit entry by American
producers.239
III. WHY PROMOTE CONVERGENCE OF ANTITRUST AND
TRADE LAW?
This next Part discusses the benefits of harmonizing antitrust and an-
233. See id.
234. See supra note 25 (discussing market concentration).
235. See Galasso, supra note 220, at 415 (noting the "consumer welfare justification"
for policing foreign predatory activity).
236. See id. But see GA 7T Director Says Success of Talks Would Help Consumers, 10
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 33, at 1370-71 (Aug. 18, 1993) ["Talks Would Help Con-
sumers"] (quoting Peter Sutherland, Director General of the GATT, who, referring to
trade law protectionism, noted that "[u]nfortunately the reality is that the cost of saving a
job, in terms of higher prices and taxes, is frequently far higher than the wage paid to the
workers concerned").
237. There is a substantial body of literature reflecting vast differences of opinion on
the appropriate goals of antitrust. Compare Posner, supra note 61, at 4, 18-22 (arguing
that antitrust law should emphasize the efficient operation of markets and that restricting
freedom of action by large business firms in favor of promoting small business is an inap-
propriate application of antitrust) with Harlan M. Blake & William K. Jones, In Defense
of Antitrust, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 377, 383-84 (1965) (arguing that though antitrust should
ensure efficient allocation of resources rather than protection of small, inefficient firms,
expanding the range of consumer choice and entrepreneurial opportunity by encouraging
the formation of markets with many buyers and sellers are equally important goals).
238. See Waller, supra note 7, § 11.01, at 11-2.
239. See Eckes, supra note 232, at 422.
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tidumping laws, using a recent trade case to illustrate the merits of
convergence.
A. Principles of Convergence
Antitrust law encourages low consumer prices by promoting vigorous
competition between producers.2" Conversely, the antidumping laws
protect domestic producers from foreign predatory dumping.241 As a re-
sult, these two areas often conflict.242 Initially the harmonization of anti-
trust and trade law appears to require an election between promoting
either consumer or producer welfare. The lines between producer and
consumer welfare, however, are not as clearly delineated as they once
were. Today, in an increasingly globalized marketplace, domestic produ-
cers have greater opportunities to purchase component parts and raw
materials from abroad.243 A trade policy that increases costs of these
intermediate goods may injure domestic producers,244 as well as consum-
ers. American producers who pay higher prices for intermediate goods
must pass these increased costs along to consumers. Not only does this
injure American consumers, 24' but it also injures domestic producers
since they become less competitive than foreign firms producing similar
products abroad. Not burdened by the antidumping duties levied on
components imported into the United States, such foreign producers can
keep costs of production comparatively low.
Use of the trade laws to insulate domestic producers from efficient for-
eign competitors has other consequences-it causes trade and budget def-
icits. Such consequences are evident in other national economies.246 In
240. See supra Part I.A.
241. See supra Part I.B.
242. See supra note 1; Parts II.B., C., G., H. & I.
243. According to one report, one-half of all Japanese exports to the United States are
intermediate goods. See Robert Neff, The Japanese Are Hardly Heading for the Bunkers,
Bus. Wk., Feb. 28, 1994, at 29.
244. See Talks Would Help Consumers, supra note 236. Peter Sutherland, Director
General of the GATT, noted that, "[v]irtually all protection [from imports] means higher
prices. And someone has to pay; either the consumer or, in the case of intermediate
goods, another producer." See id.
245. See Bovard, supra note 10, at 108 ("While many people consider dumping an
arcane subject, dumping penalties have forced Americans to pay more for photo albums,
pears, mirrors, ethanol, cement, shock absorbers, roof shingles, codfish, televisions, paint
brushes, cookware, motorcycle batteries, bicycles, martial art uniforms, computers and
computer disks, telephone systems, forklifts, radios, flowers, aspirin, staplers and staples,
paving equipment, and fireplace mesh panels.").
246. See Stewart A. Baker, Panel Discussion, EEC Trade Law and the United States,
1987 Fordham Corp. L. Inst. 527, 531 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1988). Mr. Baker noted that
a change in prevailing attitudes toward the trade laws might soon occur among
lawmakers. He continued:
I have practiced trade law in one country that used to lead the world in
applying the antidumping law strictly. Perhaps as a result, perhaps not, that
country ultimately found that it had a well-protected manufacturing sector at
home but very few manufacturing exports; it found itself relying on agricultural
and raw material exports and running big trade and budget deficits; when peo-
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sum, harmonization of antidumping and antitrust laws (1) minimizes, to
the extent possible, protectionist abuses of trade laws so that consumers
and producers may benefit from increased competition and lower prices,
and (2) concurrently protects domestic industries from foreign predatory
activity. Any such reform, however, must provide a consistent standard
for both domestic and international trade.
B. An Illustration: The Japanese Laptop Computer Screen Dispute
Japanese manufacturers are an important source of the flat-panel
screens found in laptop and notebook-type computers today.247 These
screens, known as "active-matrix liquid crystal displays, ' 2 41 were in-
vented in the United States, though they received their greatest commer-
cial development in Japan.249 In recent years, these laptop and
notebook-type computers have been "the fastest-growing segment of the
personal computer market., 20 Apple, Compaq, and IBM have all used
flat-panel screens in their laptop and notebook computers, relying on
Japanese sources for these components.25' In fact, Japanese producers
currently control ninety-five percent of the $4 billion world market for
these screens.25 2
The Advanced Display Manufacturers Association of America" s filed
an antidumping petition against Japanese manufacturers of flat-panel
screens in July 1990.254 The Commerce Department determined that
Japanese manufacturers were dumping these flat-panel screens on the
American market255 and recommended a 62.7% dumping duty." 6 The
ple began to believe the deficits were permanent, it suffered a collapse in foreign
investor confidence. In the ensuing devaluation-cum-recession, the government
began to rethink much of its trade law.
The United States is most of the way down a road already traveled by
Australia.
Id. (emphasis added).
247. See Daily Report for Executives; Regulation, Economics and Law, Technology:
Pentagon Announces $580 Million Plan to Develop Flat-Panel Computer Screens, 1994
Daily Exec. Rep. 81, at A-I (Apr. 29, 1994) ["$580 Million Plan"]. Hosiden Electronics,
Matsushita Electric, Sharp Corporation, and Toshiba Corporation all produce flat-panel
screens for American laptop computer manufacturers. Flat-panel displays are also used
in medical instruments, industrial controls, commercial avionics, and there is potential
for their application in high-definition television. See Daily Report for Executives; Regu-
lation, Economics and Law, International Trade: ITA Preliminarily Finds That Japan Is
Dumping Computer Screens, 1991 Daily Exec. Rep. 32, at A-4 (Feb. 15, 1991).
248. Stuart Auerbach, U.S. Rules Japan 'Dumping' Advanced Computer Screens,
Wash. Post, July 9, 1991, at Cl, C3.
249. See id
250. Id. at Cl.
251. See id
252. See $580 Million Plan, supra note 247.
253. See Andrew Pollack, Duties Sought From Japan On Some Computer Screens,
N.Y. Times, July 9, 1991, at DI (noting that the organization consists of seven fledgling
American flat-panel screen manufacturers).
254. See id
255. See Certain High-Information Content Flat Panel Displays and Display Glass
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American screen manufacturers were then relatively small companies
and the United States Government was their only customer.257 At the
time, the American screen manufacturers did not produce the color ver-
sion of these screens, 2 58 nor were they designing their screens for com-
puters when they filed their complaint. 25 9 American manufacturers of
laptop computers did not use the American screen manufacturers as a
source of the flat-panel screens because they felt that the domestic screen
producers could not provide screens or services suitable for their
laptops.2 6°
Not surprisingly, American laptop computer manufacturers opposed
the duty on the imported screens.26' They argued that high duties on
such a vital component part would increase retail prices for their com-
puters and make them uncompetitive against imported Japanese
laptops.262 Since the duties would apply only to the screens and not to
fully assembled computers, the American computer manufacturers
feared that the duties would force them to manufacture computers over-
seas, 2 6 3 where the American antidumping duty on the screens would not
apply. According to one source, the proposed duty on the screens
prompted Apple Computer to abandon its plans to manufacture laptops
in Colorado, and choose to manufacture in Ireland.264 IBM reportedly
considered moving its production of laptops out of the United States.2 65
Toshiba closed its production facility in Irvine, California, and moved
back to Japan.266 This case demonstrates the potential negative effects of
dumping duties on American producers, consumers, and laborers. Not
surprisingly, the flat-panel screen case has been characterized as "a text-
book illustration of what is wrong with the dumping law." 26 7
Therefor from Japan, USITC Pub. 2413, Inv. No. 731-TA-469, at 1-3 (1991) (final)
["Flat-Panel Display Report"].
256. See McGee, supra note 10, at 537.
257. See id. at 538. Currently, American producers hold less than three percent of the
world market for flat-panel screens. See $580 Million Plan, supra note 247.
258. See Daily Report for Executives; Regulation, Economics and Law, International
Trade: Japan Set to Appeal To GATT On U.S. Antidumping Ruling For Flat-Panel
Screens, 1991 Daily Exec. Rep. 210, at A-3 (Oct. 30, 1991).
259. See Auerbach, supra note 248, at C3.
260. See McGee, supra note 10, at 538.
261. See Daily Report for Executives; Regulation, Economics and Law, International
Trade: U.S. Manufacturers Threatened By Duties On Japanese Computer Displays, 1991
Daily Exec. Rep. 113, at A-7 (Jun. 12, 1991) ["U.S. Manufacturers Threatened"]; Flat-
Panel Display Report, supra note 255, at B-37 to B-38 (noting that Apple, Compaq, IBM,
Tandy, and Texas Instruments opposed the duty on imported screens).
262. See Auerbach, supra note 248, at CI.
263. See id.
264. See McGee, supra note 10, at 537.
265. See id.
266. See id.
267. U.S. Manufacturers Threatened, supra note 261.
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IV. MOVING TOWARD CONVERGENCE: AN INTERNATIONAL
TRADE ANALOGUE TO ROBINSON-PATMAN
Harmonization of antitrust and trade law is imperative. Several com-
mentators have offered proposals for convergence.268 This Part argues
that an international trade analogue to Robinson-Patman effectively ac-
commodates the competing concerns of trade and antitrust law, thus pro-
tecting American consumers and producers alike.269
A. Application of an International Trade Analogue to
Robinson-Patman
Congress must modify or replace the antidumping laws with a law
modeled on the Robinson-Patman Act.
This proposal lends itself to the antidumping context because the
Commerce Department can administer the Robinson-Patman analogue
in the same manner as it applies the current antidumping laws. Thus,
under the proposed statute, a domestic industry petitions the Commerce
Department when a foreign producer is suspected of dumping products
on the American market. Under the proposed law, however, rather than
undertake separate LTFV and injury determinations, the Commerce De-
partment evaluates the foreign producer's behavior using established
predatory-pricing tests from Sherman Act jurisprudence-the same tests
that Robinson-Patman courts have applied.27°
Consistent with current trade policy, the proposed statute does not
permit a private right of action. Rather, the Commerce Department ap-
plies predatory-pricing tests to evaluate dumping complaints and tariff
assessments follow from affirmative findings of product dumping.2 7'
268. See e.g., Davey, supra note 14, at 8-40 to 8-41 (suggesting elimination of biases in
procedures for calculating dumping margins, a restriction on the application of the an-
tidumping laws to concentrated industries, and automatic expiration of antidumping or-
ders after a period of several years); Schoenbaum, supra note 149, at 23 (suggesting either
the elimination of the antidumping laws or merging the most effective provisions of § 301
of the Trade Act of 1974 with § 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 as a unified remedy for all
unfair trade practices); Wood, supra note 10, at 1196-98 (proposing to limit antidumping
remedies where the complaining domestic industry is concentrated).
269. Several commentators have compared the Antidumping Act to the Robinson-Pat-
man Act. See, e.g., Applebaum & Grace, supra note 133, at 507-12 (noting the differences
in injury standards between the two statutes and the lack of defenses under the An-
tidumping Act); Davey, supra note 14, at 8-19 to 8-21 (noting the difference in injury
standards under the Robinson-Patman Act and the Antidumping Act).
270. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
271. As an additional disincentive for abuse by concentrated domestic industries, rem-
edies could be tied to the concentration level of the complaining domestic producer. See
Wood, supra note 10, at 1196-98 (arguing that antidumping remedies should be inversely
proportional to the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index ("HHI") of market concentration of the
complaining industry). Professor Wood advocates continued application of the existing
antidumping procedure, and would allow for tariffs in the full amount of the dumping
margin where the relevant HHI is below 1000. For complaining industries with higher
HHIs, the amount of tariff imposed would proportionally decrease. She would disallow
any tariffs where complaining industries have HHIs above 4000. Accordingly, injury to
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B. Significant Benefits Follow From Applying Robinson-Patman to
Trade Cases
An international trade analogue to Robinson-Patman has several ad-
vantages over the current Antidumping Act.
First, the proposed statute promotes convergence between trade and
antitrust policy by introducing into trade law accepted predatory-pricing
tests from Sherman Act jurisprudence 272 and, in so doing, promotes con-
sistency between trade law and normative economics.
Second, an antidumping law modeled on Robinson-Patman properly
balances deterrence of frivolous antidumping petitions with incentives to
bring trade actions where viable claims of foreign predation exist. The
Robinson-Patman Act, as currently interpreted, requires a substantial
lessening of competition2 73 before relief may be granted. Adopting this
standard in antidumping actions discourages abuse of the antidumping
laws by domestic industries seeking protection from foreign competition.
This approach is preferable to a private right of action, particularly an
action with such incentives as treble damages2 74 for successful petition-
ers. At the same time, the proposed statute allows domestic consumers
the benefits of competitively priced goods and lowers the cost to domestic
producers of some imported intermediate goods.
Third, application of Robinson-Patman principles to antidumping
cases bypasses existing jurisdictional hurdles and foreign policy concerns
in litigating predatory-pricing claims against foreign defendants. Signifi-
cant jurisdictional hurdles impede application of the antitrust laws to for-
eign anticompetitive activity.275 In trade proceedings, however, upon a
finding of dumping, the Customs Department assesses a duty as the com-
modities arrive in the United States.27 6
Finally, the proposed statute provides Robinson-Patman defenses-
"cost justification," "meeting competition," and "changing condi-
tions"2 77-in trade cases. These defenses enable the Commerce Depart-
ment to separate well-founded claims of foreign predation from frivolous
claims, at an early stage in the proceedings. These defenses have been
applicable to trade cases in the past.278 Notably, the Justice Department
the U.S. producers would be recognized and compensated only to the extent that a firm is
unable to survive marginal cost pricing.
272. See supra Parts I.A.2.b.i. & I.A.3.
273. See supra note 79.
274. See supra note 7 (discussing Senator Metzenbaum's pending proposal to amend
the Antidumping Act of 1916, to create a private right of action for victims of predatory
dumping by foreign producers).
275. See supra Part II.A.
276. See supra note 131; Marques Mendes, supra note 1, at 166 (noting that, for those
seeking protection from foreign predatory activity, resort to the trade laws avoids some of
the jurisdictional problems associated with extraterritorial application of the antitrust
laws).
277. See supra notes 98-111 and accompanying text.
278. See, e.g., 64K Dynamic Random Access Memory Components from Japan,
USITC Pub. 1862, Inv. No. 731-TA-270, at 17-18 (1986) (final) (imports found to have
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has argued, without success, that importers should be entitled to meet
competition with domestic producers without being sanctioned for sell-
ing at less-than-fair-value. 7 9 Currently, where an industry can choose
between bringing an antitrust suit and an import relief proceeding
against a foreign competitor, it will invariably choose the latter because
the antitrust defenses do not apply.2 0
C. The Counterarguments Are Unpersuasive
Critics have asserted that Robinson-Patman creates inflexibility in
price movements by discouraging producers from charging a profit-maxi-
mizing price in all markets.28' This criticism, however, is not well-
founded. The current antidumping laws sanction price discrimination
between national markets, but do not allow for the defenses available
under Robinson-Patman. Moreover, domestic producers advocating an-
tidumping law reform indicate that the current laws have had negligible
deterrent effects on international price discrimination. 82 Thus, it is un-
likely that Robinson-Patman would create any rigidity in price move-
ments greater than that already present under the current antidumping
regime. Finally, the availability of treble damages may be responsible for
any inflexibility of price movements under Robinson-Patman. 83 Impor-
tantly, the proposed law does not provide a private right of action for
dumping and thus treble damages remain unavailable.
A second criticism is that disputes over the characterization of costs as
fixed or variable have often arisen in the antitrust context. One court
approaches the variable/fixed cost inquiry by noting that wherever true
predatory pricing exists, there is an expansion in output to satisfy the
increased demand that a lower price creates. 284 Because this expansion
in output is attributable to the allegedly predatory price cut, the costs
that increase as a result of the expanded output are treated as variable.28
If the per-unit price of the good is below the average of these increased/
variable costs, then the price reduction may then be considered preda-
tory.286 At present, characterization of legitimately disputed costs as
fixed or variable may be "a matter for the jury under appropriate
caused material injury even though the price cutting in question was initiated by a U.S.
producer).
279. See Applebaum, supra note 1, at 413.
280. See Marques Mendes, supra note 1, at 166.
281. See Hansen, supra note 83, at 1190-93.
282. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
283. See Harry L. Shniderman, The Robinson-Patman Act: A Critical Appraisal, 55
Antitrust L.J. 149, 152 (1986).
284. See William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d
1014, 1037 (9th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982).
285. See id at 1037.
286. See id The Inglis court also considered other factors, holding that, although
AVC is generally a reliable indicator of predatory intent, there are market situations
where it would be prudent for a firm to sell below AVC. See id. at 1035 n.32. Conversely,
it acknowledged that in certain instances, a firm could be liable for predation where it was
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instructions. 28 7
Disputes between parties in characterizing costs as fixed or variable are
particularly likely in the international trade context, due to socioeco-
nomic differences between nations. For example, in Japan, where em-
ployment has been traditionally characterized as a life-long entitlement,
producers often view labor as a fixed cost.288 American producers, how-
ever, treat labor as a variable cost.28 9 The Commerce Department might
address this issue by setting its own definitions of fixed and variable costs
to ensure uniform application of price-cost tests in antidumping
disputes.29°
Critics also contend that acquiring evidence of a foreign producer's
costs to prove sales at less than average variable cost or marginal cost is
difficult. 291 While this argument is itself debatable, 292 the current an-
tidumping laws already authorize the Commerce Department to engage
in a complex constructed-value analysis of a foreign producer's costs
when insufficient sales of the product in the exporting country leave the
home market price incalculable.2 93 In contrast, antitrust courts have
widely applied variations of the Areeda-Turner test.
294
Finally, some commentators argue that predatory pricing may be
nearly impossible to prove,295 particularly in light of the Supreme
pricing above AVC. See id. at 1035. Consequently, it focused "on what a rational firm
would have expected its prices to accomplish." Id. at 1034.
287. Id. at 1038. See also Kelco Disposal, Inc. v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., 845
F.2d 404, 408 (2d Cir. 1988) (concluding that jury could have reasonably characterized
depreciation of heavy equipment as a variable cost), aff'd, 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
288. See John H. Jackson, Dumping in International Trade: Its Meaning and Context,
in Comparative Study, supra note 136, at 21-22.
289. See Alan V. Deardorff, Economic Perspectives on Antidumping Law, in Compara-
tive Study, supra note 136, at 31-33.
290. See, e.g., Janich Bros., Inc. v. American Distilling Co., 570 F.2d 848, 858 & n.1 I
(9th Cir. 1977) (allocating categories of fixed and variable costs as a matter of law), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 829 (1978); 3 Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Antitrust Law 173-74
(1978) (characterizing all costs as variable except capital costs, property and other taxes
unaffected by output, and depreciation of plant life). Some courts, however, have rejected
the Janich and Areeda-Turner approach of arbitrarily categorizing costs. See, e.g., Wil-
liam Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1037 (9th
Cir. 1981) (comparing costs before and after increases in output to determine whether
costs are fixed or variable), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982); D.E. Rogers Assocs. v.
Gardner-Denver Co., 718 F.2d 1431, 1437 (6th Cir. 1983) (declining to follow the
Areeda-Turner classification of fixed and variable costs, noting that "it is impossible to
determine in advance and outside the specific factual context the variability of any partic-
ular expense"), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1242 (1984).
291. See Galasso, supra note 220, at 413 & n.32.
292. See Elzinga, supra note 1, at 442 ("[T]he Areeda-Turner test is both a breeze to
apply and a breath of fresh air compared to the exercise of determining [LTFV]" under
the Antidumping Act.).
293. See supra Part II.G.
294. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
295. See, e.g., Barcel6, supra note 14, at 65 ("A persuasive line of economic analysis
suggests that predatory pricing will be rare because it is costly and the benefits are both
doubtful and in any event obtainable through less costly means."); Robert H. Bork, The
Antitrust Paradox 155 (1978) ("[P]redatory price cutting is most unlikely to exist and...
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Court's decision in Matsushita.296 Commentators argue that courts tend
to view price cuts as procompetitive297 and dismiss predatory-pricing
cases on grounds that predatory pricing is very rarely attempted and,
when attempted, is rarely successful.2 98 Indeed, some commentators be-
lieve that Matsushita heralds the demise of successful predatory-pricing
Suits. 2 9 9 This skepticism, however, is not apparent in the case law.3"° In
fact, since Matsushita, even the Supreme Court has acknowledged that
predatory pricing occurs.30 1
attempts to outlaw it are likely to harm consumers more than would abandoning the
effort.").
296. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (granting
summary judgment for defendant in suit alleging conspiracy to eliminate competitors
through below-cost pricing).
297. See id. at 594 ("[C]utting prices in order to increase business often is the very
essence of competition. Thus, mistaken inferences in cases such as this one are especially
costly, because they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect.").
298. See id at 588-89 ("A predatory-pricing conspiracy is by nature specula-
tive .... [T]here is a consensus among commentators that predatory-pricing schemes are
rarely tried, and even more rarely successful.").
299. See, e.g., Brenda S. Levine, Predatory Pricing Conspiracies After Matsushita In-
dustrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.: Can an Antitrust Plaintiff Survive the Supreme Court's
Skepticism?, 22 Int'l L. 529, 541 (1988) (noting that the Matsushita decision raised the
standard of proof necessary to infer a predatory-pricing conspiracy, encouraged competi-
tors to engage in predatory pricing, and discouraged redress in the courts for such
predation).
300. See, e.g., Irvin Indus., Inc. v. Goodyear Aerospace Corp., 974 F.2d 241, 245 (2d
Cir. 1992) (holding that defendant seller's bid, which was below reasonably anticipated
AVC, was presumptively predatory); McGahee v. Northern Propane Gas Co., 858 F.2d
1487, 1496 (1 1th Cir. 1988) (reversing summary judgment for defendant in holding that
test for predatory pricing must consider subjective evidence and should use average total
cost as the cost above which no inference of predatory intent can be made), cert. denied,
490 U.S. 1084 (1989); Kelco Disposal, Inc. v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., 845 F.2d
404, 408 (2d Cir. 1988) (affirming jury verdict of attempted monopolization through
predatory pricing), aff'd, 492 U.S. 257 (1989); Instructional Sys. Dev. Corp. v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 817 F.2d 639, 646, 648 (10th Cir. 1987) (distinguishing Matsushita as
applicable only to § 1 conspiracy claims and reversing summary judgment for defendant
in holding that "sales above [AVC] do not preclude a finding of predatory pricing if other
factors are present indicating unreasonably anticompetitive behavior); Marsann Co. v.
Brammall, Inc., 788 F.2d 611, 613-15 & n.1 (9th Cir. 1986) (distinguishing Matsushita as
applicable only to § 1 claims and maintaining its pre-Matsushita position that a preda-
tory-pricing plaintiff need not prove pricing below any measure of cost to survive sum-
mary judgment); But see Clamp-All Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst., 851 F.2d 478, 483
(Ist Cir. 1988) (stating that plaintiff had not introduced evidence that defendant priced
below AVC in affirming summary judgment for defendant), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1007
(1989); Stitt Spark Plug Co. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 840 F.2d 1253, 1255-56 (5th
Cir.) (summarily dismissing a predatory-pricing claim pursuant to Matsushita), cert. de-
nied, 488 U.S. 890 (1988). See also Martin S. Simkovic, Comment, Judicial Tests to De-
termine Predatory Pricing Before and After Matsushita, 44 U. Miami L. Rev. 839, 862-63
(1990) (arguing that Matsushita has had little influence on those courts of appeals that
view predatory-pricing claims more favorably than the Supreme Court, whereas courts
already skeptical of predatory-pricing claims tend to summarily dismiss such cases, citing
Matsushita).
301. See Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 121 & n.16 (1986).
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CONCLUSION
"It is high time that governments made clear to consumers just how
much they pay-in the shops and as taxpayers-for decisions to pro-
tect domestic industries from import competition."
30 2
A change in the current antidumping laws is imperative. Congress
must modify or replace the antidumping laws to check abuses of trade
laws by domestic industries. A trade statute modeled on the Robinson-
Patman Act, by applying price-cost analysis and permitting appropriate
defenses in trade cases, provides a consistent definition of unfair trade for
domestic and international trade. Such reform properly balances pro-
ducer protection from foreign predation with gains to consumer welfare
from competitively priced imports. Though the political climate inside
the Beltway today is decidedly against such a change, the need for con-
vergence of antitrust and trade law is becoming ever more apparent in an
increasingly globalized economy.
302. See Talks Would Help Consumers, supra note 236 (quoting Peter Sutherland, Di-
rector General of the GATT).
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